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#### The aff commodifies the suffering of Mexicans in poverty in exchange for your ballot in the debate economy---playing a game where we move scenarios of suffering around like chess pieces for our own personal enjoyment is the most unethical form of intellectual imperialism---the alt is to reject the aff’s cherry-picking of misery

Baudrillard 94 [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71]

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history.¶ The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶ In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world.¶ Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

#### Translating misery into capital is a perverse system of neoimperial academia---vote negative to reject their cherry-picking of misery and refuse to engage in the trauma economy

Tomsky 11 (Terri, Ph.D in English from U-British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow in cultural memory at the University of Alberta From Sarajevo to 9/11: Travelling Memory and the Trauma Economy, Parallax Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011)

In contrast to the cosmopolitization of a Holocaust cultural memory,1 there exist experiences of trauma that fail to evoke recognition and subsequently, compassion and aid. What is it exactly that confers legitimacy onto some traumatic claims and anonymity onto others? This is not merely a question of competing victimizations, what geographer Derek Gregory has criticized as the process of ‘cherry-picking among [ . . . ] extremes of horror’, but one that engages issues of the international travel, perception and valuation of traumatic memory.2 This seemingly arbitrary determination engrosses the e´migre´ protagonist of Dubravka Ugresic’s 2004 novel, The Ministry of Pain, who from her new home in Amsterdam contemplates an uneven response to the influx of claims by refugees fleeing the Yugoslav wars: The Dutch authorities were particularly generous about granting asylum to those who claimed they had been discriminated against in their home countries for ‘sexual differences’, more generous than to the war’s rape victims. As soon as word got round, people climbed on the bandwagon in droves. The war [ . . . ] was something like the national lottery: while many tried their luck out of genuine misfortune, others did it simply because the opportunity presented itself.3¶ Traumatic experiences are described here in terms analogous to social and economic capital. What the protagonist finds troubling is that some genuine refugee claimants must invent an alternative trauma to qualify for help: the problem was that ‘nobody’s story was personal enough or shattering enough. Because death itself had lost its power to shatter. There had been too many deaths’.4 In other words, the mass arrival of Yugoslav refugees into the European Union means that war trauma risks becoming a surfeit commodity and so decreases in value. I bring up Ugresic’s wry observations about trauma’s marketability because they enable us to conceive of a trauma economy, a circuit of movement and exchange where traumatic memories ‘travel’ and are valued and revalued along the way.¶ Rather than focusing on the end-result, the winners and losers of a trauma ‘lottery’, this article argues that there is, in a trauma economy, no end at all, no fixed value to any given traumatic experience. In what follows I will attempt to outline the system of a trauma economy, including its intersection with other capitalist power structures, in a way that shows how representations of trauma continually circulate and, in that circulation enable or disable awareness of particular traumatic experience across space and time. To do this, I draw extensively on the comic nonfiction of Maltese-American writer Joe Sacco and, especially, his retrospective account of newsgathering during the 1992–1995 Bosnian war in his 2003 comic book, The Fixer: A Story From Sarajevo.5 Sacco is the author of a series of comics that represent social life in a number of the world’s conflict zones, including the Palestinian territories and the former Yugoslavia. A comic artist, Sacco is also a journalist by profession who has first-hand experience of the way that war and trauma are reported in the international media. As a result, his comics blend actual reportage with his ruminations on the media industry. The Fixer explores the siege of Sarajevo (1992–1995) as part of a larger transnational network of disaster journalism, which also critically, if briefly, references the September eleventh, 2001 attacks in New York City. Sacco’s emphasis on the transcultural coverage of these traumas, with his comic avatar as the international journalist relaying information on the Bosnian war, emphasizes how trauma must be understood in relation to international circuits of mediation and commodification. My purpose therefore is not only to critique the aesthetic of a travelling traumatic memory, but also to call attention to the material conditions and networks that propel its travels.¶ Travelling Trauma Theorists and scholars have already noted the emergence, circulation and effects of traumatic memories, but little attention has been paid to the travelling itself. This is a concern since the movement of any memory must always occur within a material framework. The movement of memories is enabled by infrastructures of power, and consequently mediated and consecrated through institutions. So, while some existing theories of traumatic memory have made those determining politics and policies visible, we still don’t fully comprehend the travel of memory in a global age of media, information networks and communicative capitalism.6 As postcolonial geographers frequently note, to travel today is to travel in a world striated by late capitalism. The same must hold for memory; its circulation in this global media intensive age will always be reconfigured, transvalued and even commodified by the logic of late capital.¶ While we have yet to understand the relation between the travels of memory (traumatic or otherwise) and capitalism, there are nevertheless models for the circulation of other putatively immaterial things that may prove instructive. One of the best, I think, is the critical insight of Edward W. Said on what he called ‘travelling theory’.7 In 1984 and again in 1994, Said wrote essays that described the reception and reformulation of ideas as they are uprooted from an original historical and geographical context and propelled across place and time. While Said’s contribution focuses on theory rather than memory, his reflections on the travel and transformation of ideas provide a comparison which helpfully illuminates the similar movements of what we might call ‘travelling trauma’. Ever attendant to the historical specificities that prompt transcultural transformations, the ‘Travelling Theory’ essays offers a Vichian humanist reading of cultural production; in them, Said argues that theory is not given but made. In the first instance, it emanates out of and registers the sometimes urgent historical circumstances of its theorist.¶ Subsequently, he maintains, when other scholars take up the theory, they necessarily interpret it, additionally integrating their own social and historical experiences into it, so changing the theory and, often, authorizing it in the process. I want to suggest that Said’s bird’s eye view of the intellectual circuit through which theory travels, is received and modified can help us appreciate the movement of cultural memory. As with theory, cultural memories of trauma are lifted and separated from their individual source as they travel; they are mediated, transmitted and institutionalized in particular ways, depending on the structure of communication and communities in which they travel.¶ Said invites his readers to contemplate how the movement of theory transforms its meanings to such an extent that its significance to sociohistorical critique can be drastically curtailed. Using Luka´ cs’s writings on reification as an example, Said shows how a theory can lose the power of its original formulation as later scholars take it up and adapt it to their own historical circumstances. In Said’s estimation, Luka´ cs’s insurrectionary vision became subdued, even domesticated, the wider it circulated. Said is especially concerned to describe what happens when such theories come into contact with academic institutions, which impose through their own mode of producing cultural capital, a new value upon then. Said suggests that this authoritative status, which imbues the theory with ‘prestige and the authority of age’, further dulls the theory’s originally insurgent message.8 When Said returned to and revised his essay some ten years later, he changed the emphasis by highlighting the possibilities, rather than the limits, of travelling theory.¶ ‘Travelling Theory Reconsidered’, while brief and speculative, offers a look at the way Luka´ cs’s theory, transplanted into yet a different context, can ‘flame [ . . . ] out’ in a radical way.9 In particular, Said is interested in exploring what happens when intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Franz Fanon take up Luka´ cs: they reignite the ‘fiery core’ of his theory in their critiques of capitalist alienation and French colonialism. Said is interested here in the idea that theory matters and that as it travels, it creates an ‘intellectual [ . . . ] community of a remarkable [ . . . ] affiliative’ kind.10 In contrast to his first essay and its emphasis on the degradation of theoretical ideas, Said emphasizes the way a travelling theory produces new understandings as well as new political tools to deal with violent conditions and disenfranchized subjects. Travelling theory becomes ‘an intransigent practice’ that goes beyond borrowing and adaption.11 As Said sees it, both Adorno and Fanon ‘refuse the emoluments offered by the Hegelian dialectic as stabilized into resolution by Luka´ cs’.12 Instead they transform Luka´ cs into their respective locales as ‘the theorist of permanent dissonance as understood by Adorno, [and] the critic of reactive nationalism as partially adopted by Fanon in colonial Algeria’.13¶ Said’s set of reflections on travelling theory, especially his later recuperative work, are important to any account of travelling trauma, since it is not only the problems of institutional subjugation that matter; additionally, we need to affirm the occurrence of transgressive possibilities, whether in the form of fleeting transcultural affinities or in the effort to locate the inherent tensions within a system where such travel occurs. What Said implicitly critiques in his 1984 essay is the negative effects of exchange, institutionalization and the increasing use-value of critical theory as it travels within the academic knowledge economy; in its travels, the theory becomes practically autonomous, uncoupled from the theorist who created it and the historical context from which it was produced. This seems to perfectly illustrate the international circuit of exchange and valuation that occurs in the trauma economy.¶ In Sacco’s The Fixer, for example, it is not theory, but memory, which travels from Bosnia to the West, as local traumas are turned into mainstream news and then circulated for consumption. By highlighting this mediation, The Fixer explicitly challenges the politics that make invisible the maneuvers of capitalist and neoimperial practices. Like Said, Sacco displays a concern with the dissemination and reproduction of information and its consequent effects in relation to what Said described as ‘the broader political world’.14 Said’s anxiety relates to the academic normativization of theory (a ‘tame academic substitution for the real thing’15), a transformation which, he claimed, would hamper its uses for society.¶ A direct line can be drawn from Said’s discussion of the circulation of discourse and its (non)political effects, and the international representation of the 1992–1995 Bosnian war. The Bosnian war existed as a guerre du jour, the successor to the first Gulf War, receiving saturation coverage and represented daily in the Western media. The sustained presence of the media had much to do with the proximity of the war to European cities and also with the spectacular visibility of the conflict, particularly as it intensified. The bloodiest conflict to have taken place in Europe since the Second World War, it displaced two million people and was responsible for over 150,000 civilian casualties.16 Yet despite global media coverage, no decisive international military or political action took place to suspend fighting or prevent ethnic cleansing in East Bosnia, until after the massacre of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. According to Gregory Kent, western perceptions about the war until then directed the lack of political will within the international community, since the event was interpreted, codified and dismissed as an ‘ethnic’, ‘civil’ war and ‘humanitarian crisis’, rather than an act of (Serbian) aggression against (Bosnian) civilians.17¶ The rather bizarre presence of a large international press corps, hungry for drama and yet comfortably ensconced in Sarajevo’s Holiday Inn amid the catastrophic siege of that city, prompted Jean Baudrillard to formulate his theory of the hyperreal. In an article for the Paris newspaper Libe´ration in 1993, Baudrillard writes of his anger at the international apathy towards the Bosnian crisis, denouncing it as a ‘spectral war’.18 He describes it as a ‘hyperreal hell’ not because the violence was in a not-so-distant space, but because of the way the Bosnians were ‘harassed by the [international] media and humanitarian agencies’.19 Given this extensive media coverage, it is important to evaluate the role of representative discourses in relation to violence and its after effects. To begin with, we are still unsure of the consequences of this saturation coverage, though scholars have since elaborated on the racism framing much of the media discourses on the Yugoslav wars.20 More especially, it is¶ the celebrity of the Bosnian war that makes a critical evaluation of its current status in today’s media cycle all the more imperative. Bosnia’s current invisibility is fundamentally related to a point Baudrillard makes towards the end of his essay: ‘distress, misery and suffering have become the raw goods’ circulating in a global age of ‘commiseration’.21 The ‘demand’ created by a market of a sympathetic, yet selfindulgent spectators propels the global travel of trauma (or rather, the memory of that trauma) precisely because Bosnian suffering has a ‘resale value on the futures markets’.22 To treat traumatic memory as currency not only acknowledges the fact that travelling memory is overdetermined by capitalism; more pertinently, it recognizes the global system through which traumatic memory travels and becomes subject to exchange and flux. To draw upon Marx: we can comprehend trauma in terms of its fungible properties, part of a social ‘relation [that is] constantly changing with time and place’.23 This is what I call the trauma economy. By trauma economy, I am thinking of economic, cultural, discursive and political structures that guide, enable and ultimately institutionalize the representation, travel and attention to certain traumas.¶ The Trauma Economy in Joe Sacco’s The Fixer Having introduced the idea of a trauma economy and how it might operate, I want to turn to Sacco because he is acutely conscious of the way representations of trauma circulate in an international system. His work exposes the infrastructure and logic of a trauma economy in war-torn Bosnia and so echoes some of the points made by Said about the movement of theory. As I examine Sacco’s critical assessment of the Bosnian war, I want to bear in mind Said’s discussion about the effects of travel on theory and, in particular, his two contrasting observations: first, that theory can become commodified and second, that theory enables unexpected if transient solidarities across cultures. The Fixer takes up the notion of trauma as transcultural capital and commodity, something Sacco has confronted in his earlier work on Bosnia.24 The Fixer focuses on the story of Neven, a Sarajevan local and the ‘fixer’ of the comic’s title, who sells his services to international journalists, including Sacco’s avatar. The comic is¶ set in 2001, in postwar Sarajevo and an ethnically partitioned and economically devastated Bosnia, but its narrative frequently flashes back to the conflict in the mid- 1990s, and to what has been described as ‘the siege within the siege’.25 This refers not just to Sarajevo’s three and a half year siege by Serb forces but also to its backstage: the concurrent criminalization of Sarajevo through the rise of a wartime black market economy from which Bosniak paramilitary groups profited and through which they consolidated their power over Sarajevan civilians. In these flashbacks, The Fixer addresses Neven’s experience of the war, first, as a sniper for one of the Bosniak paramilitary units and, subsequently, as a professional fixer for foreign visitors, setting them up with anything they need, from war stories and tours of local battle sites to tape recorders and prostitutes. The contemporary, postwar scenes detail the ambivalent friendship between Neven and Sacco’s comic avatar. In doing so, The Fixer spares little detail about the economic value of trauma: Neven’s career as a fixer after all is reliant on what Sacco terms the ‘flashy brutality of Sarajevo’s war’.26 Even Neven admits as much to his interlocutor, without irony, let alone compassion: ‘“When massacres happened,” Neven once told me, “those were the best times. Journalists from all over the world were coming here”’.27¶ The Fixer never allows readers to forget that Neven provides his services in exchange for hard cash. So while Neven provides vital – indeed for Sacco’s avatar often the only – access to the stories and traumas of the war, we can never be sure whether he is a reliable witness or merely an opportunistic salesman. His anecdotes have the whiff of bravura about them. He expresses pride in his military exploits, especially his role in a sortie that destroyed several Serb tanks (the actual number varies increasingly each time the tale is told). He tells Sacco that with more acquaintances like himself, he ‘could have broken the siege of Sarajevo’.28 Neven’s heroic selfpresentation is consistently undercut by other characters, including Sacco’s avatar, who ironically renames him ‘a Master in the School of Front-line Truth’ and even calls upon the reader to assess the situation. One Sarajevan local remembers Neven as having a ‘big imagination’29; others castigate him as ‘unstable’30; and those who have also fought in the war reject his claims outright, telling Sacco, ‘it didn’t happen’.31¶ For Sacco’s avatar though, Neven is ‘a godsend’.32 Unable to procure information from the other denizens of Sarajevo, he is delighted to accept Neven’s version of events: ‘Finally someone is telling me how it was – or how it almost was, or how it could have been – but finally someone in this town is telling me something’.33 This discloses the true value of the Bosnian war to the Western media: getting the story ‘right’ factually is less important than getting it ‘right’ affectively. The purpose is to extract a narrative that evokes an emotional (whether voyeuristic or empathetic) response from its audience. Here we see a good example of the way a traumatic memory circulates in the trauma economy, as it travels from its site of origin and into a fantasy of a reality. Neven’s mythmaking – whether motivated by economic opportunism, or as a symptom of his own traumatized psyche – reflects back to the international community a counter-version of mediated events and spectacular traumas that appear daily in the Western media. It is worth adding that his mythmaking only has value so long as it occurs within preauthorized media circuits.¶ When Neven attempts to bypass the international journalists and sell his story instead directly to a British magazine, the account of his wartime ‘action against the 43 tanks’ is rejected on the basis that they ‘don’t print fiction’.34 The privilege of revaluing and re-narrating the trauma is reserved for people like Sacco’s avatar, who has no trouble adopting a mythic and hyperbolic tone in his storytelling: ‘it is he, Neven, who has walked through the valley of the shadow of death and blown things up along the way’.35¶ Yet Neven’s urge to narrate, while indeed part of his job, is a striking contrast to the silence of other locals. When Sacco arrives in Sarajevo in 2001 for his follow-up story, he finds widespread, deliberate resistance to his efforts to gather first-hand testimonies. Wishing to uncover the city’s ‘terrible secrets’, Sacco finds his ‘research has stalled’, as locals either refuse to meet with him or cancel their appointments.36 The suspiciousness and hostility Sacco encounters in Sarajevo is a response precisely to the international demand for trauma of the 1990s. The mass media presence during the war did little to help the city’s besieged residents; furthermore, international journalists left once the drama of war subsided to ‘the last offensives grinding up the last of the last soldiers and civilians who will die in this war’.37 The media fascination¶ with Sarajevo’s humanitarian crisis was as intense as it was fleeting and has since been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Neven’s shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco explains, he’s ‘a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is love but a transaction’.39 Neven – a hardened war veteran – provides the goods, the first-hand experience of war and, for Sacco’s avatar, that is worth every Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his implied reader: ‘I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in Sarajevo . . . [he’s] travelled one of the war’s dark roads and I’m not going to drop him till he tells me all about it’.40 Sacco’s assertion here suggests something more than a mutual exploitation. The word ‘friend’ describing Sacco’s relationship to Neven is quickly replaced by the word ‘drop’. Having sold his ‘raw goods’, Neven finds that the trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by disengaging with Bosnia’s local traumas. As Sacco suggests, ‘the war moved on and left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven’.41 The Neven of 2001 is not the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his ‘anxiety attacks’.42 His wartime actions lay heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to ‘stash [ . . . ] deep’ his bad memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar situation.¶ Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age¶ Sacco’s depiction of the trauma economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so many of the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Sacco’s work is the way it also picks up the possibility described in Edward Said’s optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential for affiliation. As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. 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As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. suffering’.48 Instead, the panel places Sacco’s (Anglophone) audience within the familiar, emotional context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, with their attendant anxieties, shock and grief and so contributes to a blurring of the hierarchical lines set up between different horrors across different spaces. Consequently, I do not see Sacco’s juxtaposition of traumas as an instance of what Michael Rothberg calls, ‘competitive memory’, the victim wars that pit winners against losers.49 Sacco gestures towards a far more complex idea that takes into account the highly mediated presentations of both traumas, which nonetheless evokes Rothberg’s notion of multidirectional memory by affirming the solidarities of trauma alongside their differences. In drawing together these two disparate events, Sacco’s drawings echo the critical consciousness in Said’s ‘Travelling Theory’ essay. Rather than suggesting one trauma is, or should be, more morally legitimate than the other, Sacco is sharply attentive to the way trauma is disseminated and recognized in the political world. The attacks on theWorld Trade Centre, like the siege of Sarajevo, transformed into discursive form epitomize what might be called victim narratives. In this way, the United States utilized international sympathy (much of which was galvanized by the stunning footage of the airliners crashing into the towers) to launch a retaliatory campaign against Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. In contrast, Bosnia in 1992 faced a precarious future, having just proclaimed its independence. As we discover in The Fixer, prior to Yugoslavia’s break-up, Bosnia had been ordered to return its armaments to the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which were then placed ‘into the hands of the rebel Serbs’, leaving the Bosnian government to ‘build an army almost from scratch’.50 The analogy between 9/11 and 1992 Sarajevo is stark: Sarajevo’s empty landscape in the panel emphasizes its defencelessness and isolation. The Fixer constantly reminds the reader about the difficulties of living under a prolonged siege in ‘a city that is cut off and being starved into submission’.51 In contrast, September 11, 2001 has attained immense cultural capital because of its status as a significant U.S. trauma. This fact is confirmed by its profound visuality, which crystallized the spectacle and site of trauma. Complicit in this process, the international press consolidated and legitimated the event’s symbolic power, by representing, mediating and dramatizing the trauma so that, as SlavojZ ˇ izˇek writes, the U.S. was elevated into ‘the sublime victim of Absolute Evil’.52 September 11 was constructed as an exceptional event, in terms of its irregular circumstances and the symbolic enormity both in the destruction of iconic buildings and in the attack on U.S. soil. Such a construction seeks to overshadow perhaps all recent international traumas and certainly all other U.S. traumas and sites of shock. Sacco’s portrayal, which locates September eleven in Sarajevo 1992, calls into question precisely this claim towards the singularity of any trauma. The implicit doubling and prefiguring of the 9/11 undercuts the exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the event. Sacco’s strategy encourages us to think outside of hegemonic epistemologies, where one trauma dominates and becomes more meaningful than others. Crucially, Sacco reminds his audience of the cultural imperialism that frames the spectacle of news and the designation of traumatic narratives in particular.¶ Postwar Bosnia and Beyond 2001 remains, then, both an accidental and a significant date in The Fixer. While the (Anglophone) world is preoccupied with a new narrative of trauma and a sense of historical rupture in a post 9/11 world, Bosnia continues to linger in a postwar limbo. Six years have passed since the war ended, but much of Bosnia’s day-to-day economy remains coded by international perceptions of the war. No longer a haven for aspiring journalists, Bosnia is now a thriving economy for international scholars of trauma and political theory, purveyors of thanotourism,53 UN peacekeepers and post-conflict nation builders (the ensemble of NGOs, charity and aid workers, entrepreneurs, contractors, development experts, and EU government advisors to the Office of the High Representative, the foreign overseer of the protectorate state that is Bosnia). On the other hand, many of Bosnia’s locals face a grim future, with a massive and everincreasing unemployment rate (ranging between 35 and 40%), brain-drain outmigration, and ethnic cantonments. I contrast these realities of 2001 because these circumstances – a flourishing economy at the expense of the traumatized population – ought to be seen as part of a trauma economy. The trauma economy, in other words, extends far beyond the purview of the Western media networks. In discussing the way traumatic memories travel along the circuits of the global media, I have described only a few of the many processes that transform traumatic events into fungible traumatic memories; each stage of that process represents an exchange that progressively reinterprets the memory, giving it a new value. Media outlets seek to frame the trauma of the Bosnian wars in ways that are consistent with the aims of pre-existing political or economic agendas; we see this in Sacco just as easily as in Ugresic’s assessment of how even a putatively liberal state like the Netherlands will necessarily inflect the value of one trauma over another. The point is that in this circulation, trauma is placed in a marketplace; the siege of Sarajevo, where an unscrupulous fixer can supply western reporters with the story they want to hear is only a concentrated example of a more general phenomenon. Traumatic memories are always in circulation, being revalued in each transaction according to the logic of supply and demand. Victim and witness; witness and reporter; reporter and audience; producer and consumer: all these parties bargain to suit their different interests. The sooner we acknowledge the influence of these interests, the closer we will come to an understanding of how trauma travels.

## off

#### Farm bill will pass—key legislators are working out food stamp differences

Politico 11/20 – “Farm bill talks intensify”, David Rogers, 11/20/13, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/11/food-stamp-costs-farm-bill-100158.html

Farm bill talks intensified Wednesday night even as a new report showed that food stamp expenditures are already beginning to fall as a share of the economy — a downward decline that’s expected to accelerate over the next five years.

Further cuts from food stamps are a major dividing point in the farm bill negotiations now, but there is growing pressure to try to reach a deal in the next few days on both the nutrition and commodity titles.

The top four members of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees met for almost 90 minutes Wednesday evening behind closed doors with staff. Further discussions are expected Thursday morning, and House Chairman Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) held out the possibility of more meetings Friday depending on what progress is being made.

“It was a good discussion. …We’re not there yet,” Lucas told reporters. “It’s complicated and we’re making progress,” echoed his Senate counterpart, Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.).

Most telling, perhaps, Minnesota Rep. Collin Peterson, the ranking Democrat on the House panel and the chairman during the last farm bill, sounded a more upbeat note than he has of late. Asked if a deal were possible this week, Peterson said, “I think it is.”

Wednesday’s report, authored by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, tracks the rapid rise of food stamp costs during the recession but also points toward evidence already of a downward slope as the economy improves.

The final numbers for fiscal 2013, which ended Sept. 30, show a modest downward drop. Outlays for October — the first month of fiscal 2014 — were about 5.5 percent below those for October 2012, a year ago. And November ushered in a 7 percent benefit cut as the Agriculture Department began to roll back increases enacted in 2009 as part of President Barack Obama’s stimulus program.

As a result, outlays for 2014 are expected to fall to $78.5 billion compared to $82.5 billion in 2013. And the Center projects that by 2018, food stamp costs will be down to 0.36 percent of the economy as measured by the gross domestic product.

That would be the lowest percentage since Obama won election in 2008 amid the financial collapse. And it represents an almost one-third reduction from the high of 0.52 percent in recent years.

Nonetheless, the dramatic growth in spending for food stamps, formally titled the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, makes it a major issue in the debate over a new farm bill — the first since the recession.

House Republicans are proposing nearly $40 billion in savings over the next decade — roughly 10 times what the Democratic Senate has supported. And the slow pace of the talks is becoming a worry for the Republican leadership.

Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) had been banking on putting the farm bill debate behind him this year, with passage of a conference report before the House goes home for Christmas in mid-December.

Lucas badly wants the framework of a deal this week and is pressing the Senate to move to at least $10 billion in savings. There are several options for achieving this without dramatic harm to the program. And to win over Democrats, a portion of the savings could be reinvested in employment and training grants to states — a priority for governors of both parties.

Nonetheless, the task has gotten far harder after the rollback in benefits this month.

This cut had been long scheduled and was inevitably part of the calculus when Obama first increased benefits temporarily to boost the economy. But the timing could not be worse for the farm bill. And Stabenow has been insisting that the multiyear savings of $11 billion should be counted with the $4 billion already in her bill.

An added hindrance is the fact that Peterson has been preoccupied with an entirely separate battle with Boehner over dairy provisions in the farm bill. As a former chairman and veteran political player, the Minnesota Democrat is an ally Lucas needs to work a deal with Democrats on food stamps. And to the extent Peterson has been so focused on dairy, it appears to have slowed progress in the talks.

The Center, a progressive nonprofit based in Washington, is respected for its own expertise regarding food stamps. And apart from the new data, the economic analysis provides some context for the fight.

“Once the economy has fully recovered, SNAP costs are expected to rise only in response to growth in the size of the low-income population and increases in food prices,” the report says. “Unlike health care programs and Social Security, there are no demographic or programmatic pressures that will cause SNAP costs to grow faster than the overall economy. Thus, SNAP is not contributing to the nation’s long-term fiscal problems.”

#### PC is key – overcomes partisanship

Josh Lederman 10/18/13, reporter for the Associated Press, and Jim Kuhnhenn, “No safe bets for Obama despite toned-down agenda,” US News and World Report, http://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2013/10/18/no-safe-bets-for-obama-despite-toned-down-agenda

WASHINGTON (AP) — Regrouping after a feud with Congress stalled his agenda, President Barack Obama is laying down a three-item to-do list for Congress that seems meager when compared with the bold, progressive agenda he envisioned at the start of his second term.¶ But given the capital's partisanship, the complexities of the issues and the limited time left, even those items — immigration, farm legislation and a budget — amount to ambitious goals that will take political muscle, skill and ever-elusive compromise to execute.¶ "Those are three specific things that would make a huge difference in our economy right now," Obama said. "And we could get them done by the end of the year if our focus is on what's good for the American people."

#### Congress doesn’t trust Mexico—engagement costs capital

AP ’13 (5/2/13, Associated Press, “Obama to Pitch Immigration Overhaul in Mexico” <http://www.newsmaxworld.com/Newsfront/obama-immigration-mexico-trip/2013/05/02/id/502393>)

For Pena Nieto, Obama's visit is a chance for him to showcase his country's economic gains. After suffering along with the U.S. during the recession, its economy is now growing at a better clip than that of the U.S. Per capita income has gone from an annual $7,900 two years ago to $10,146. ¶ ¶ But Diana Negroponte, a Latin America expert at the Brookings Institution, says corruption remains endemic, human rights are still a problem, and efforts to change and improve the judicial system have been too slow.¶ ¶ "There is concern on our side of the border that greater help needs to be given in order for Mexico to reform its system," she said.¶ ¶ Pena Nieto's changes in the security relationship with the U.S. have prompted some U.S. officials to speculate that the new president might be embracing the policies of his Institutional Revolutionary Party, which long has favored centralized political and bureaucratic control.¶ ¶ Among those watching the new steps is Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., who has held up $228 million sought by the Obama administration for Mexico under a security cooperation agreement. Under the agreement, known as the Merida Initiative, Congress has already given Mexico more than $1.9 billion in aid since 2008.¶ ¶ But Leahy, chairman of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee that oversees the State Department budget, has been a critic of how the money has been used and with the results.¶ ¶ "Congress has been asked for a significant new investment, but it's not clear what the new Mexican government's intensions are," Leahy said in a statement to The Associated Press. "We're in a period of uncertainty until we know enough to be able to reset that part of our relationship. I'm not ready to sign off on more money without a lot more details."

#### New farm bill key to prevent a food price spike

Nelson 10/17/13 [Joe Nelson, writer for WEAU news, “Obama, ag industry waiting for new Farm bill,” <http://www.weau.com/home/headlines/Obama-ag-industry-waiting-for-new-Farm-Bill-228259521.html>]

With the government shutdown over, farmers are still waiting for a deal to be made.¶ President Obama listed the farm bill as one of his top priorities to address, which could protect farmers and low income families.¶ “We should pass a farm bill, one that American farmers and ranchers can depend on, one that protects vulnerable children and adults in times of need, one that gives rural communities opportunities to grow and the long-term certainty that they deserve. Again, the Senate's already passed a solid bipartisan bill. It's got support from democrats and republicans. It's sitting in the House waiting for passage. If House republicans have ideas that they think would improve the farm bill, let's see them. Let's negotiate. What are we waiting for? Let's get this done,” Obama said.¶ Farmers said if they struggle without a farm bill, it could cause food prices to spike, force some out of the industry and damage the economy.¶ “If the milk price falls below a certain level, the Farm bill does help support farmers during a time of an economic crisis when prices drop too low,” Chippewa County U.W. Extension Crops and Soils Educator, Jerry Clark¶ The current, five-year Farm bill was temporarily extended, but both farmers and Clark said with much to lose, a new one is needed.¶ “Any time we can get the new bill passed, it's definitely going to help because there's always new changes in agriculture, as far as commodities or practices that need to be implemented,” Clark said. “So those types of things should be passed to keep up with the current trends in agriculture.¶ Durand corn and soybean farmer and Value Implement dealer TJ Poeschel says not having a new farm bill and reverting to a bill from 1949 could cut down profits or even force some farmers to quit or retire.

#### Extinction

Brown 9 (Lester R, Founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute “Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=civilization-food-shortages>)

The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation¶ One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis.¶ For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization.¶ I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever.As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

## off

#### Chinese influence is increasing and replacing Mexico’s need for US involvement

Shahani ’13 – Arjan, “Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Visit to Mexico,” AQ, 6/5/13, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/chinese-president-xi-jinping-visit-to-mexico>

Slowly but surely, from a diplomatic standpoint, Mexico is taking steps to reestablish itself as an outspoken, independent and active player, and is engaging emerging and established world powers beyond its neighbor to the North. In April, Peña Nieto’s participation in the conference of the Boao Forum For Asia—a China-based forum similar to the World Economic Forum—and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Mexico this week are a clear example of Mexico’s global pivot. President Xi’s visit, foreshadows a stronger bilateral commercial and diplomatic relationship. Fox and Calderón did very little to maintain the strategic alliance that the PRI had built with China, and Calderón angered the Chinese government in 2011 when he received the Dalai Lama at the presidential residence. But now, officials from the federal government and representatives from the private sector involved in President Xi’s visit are predicting the launch of a strategic, integral and functional alliance between China and Mexico. They are not exaggerating: as agreements reached during the visit show, this is much more than Xi making a courtesy call. Amapola Grijalva, vice president of the Mexico-China Chamber of Commerce, told journalist Darío Celis in a June 3 radio interview that “agreements reached between the two delegations will help narrow the commercial balance gap between the countries, will open up a huge market for Mexican exporters, and will allow China to provide financing for important heavy infrastructure projects in the near future.” Grijalva estimates that “during Peña’s administration, up to $81 billion coming from China could go into financing new industrial naval port complexes, airports, telecom projects, and railway transportation systems.” A joint declaration signed and issued by Peña Nieto and Xi on June 4 summarizes the amount of work already invested in the renewed Mexico-China relationship. The two leaders signed memorandums of understanding to formally establish cooperation in energy, mining, emerging industries, infrastructure, private sector collaboration, university alliances, trade, banking, and even the oil industry. In addition, it was announced that sanitary measures have been met to reopen the Chinese market to pork from Mexico, and an agreement was reached to allow all forms of tequila into China. Additionally, to promote tourism in both countries, Peña Nieto and Xi expressed their mutual interest in expanding international flights connecting Mexico and China and in establishing a working relationship between their tourism ministries. In the political arena, Peña Nieto took the opportunity to amend Calderón’s diplomatic gaffe by ratifying the “One China” principle. Peña Nieto stated that it is Mexico’s position that both Taiwan and the Tibet are part of Chinese territory and Tibetan affairs are an internal issue for China. In the statement, both parties declared that “given the improvement of diverse mechanisms in the bilateral cooperation, the conditions are such that Mexico-China relations can be elevated to a new level of benefit to both nations.” They also established a calendar of working visits from high-level government officials to implement the agreements and scheduled future meetings during upcoming international forums including the UN, APEC and the G20. As President Xi’s visit shows, the coming years are certain to bring Mexico and China diplomatically closer and to catalyze economic growth, trade and development in a mutually beneficial way—while breaking Mexico’s trade dependency on the U.S. market.

#### China and Mexico cooperating on agriculture now

Chinese Ministry of Agriculture ‘12

(“Niu Dun Co-chairs 5th China-Mexico Agricultural Working Group meeting” April 5, 2012 <http://english.agri.gov.cn/ic/ao/201304/t20130412_19396.htm>)

China and Mexico held the 5th Agricultural Working Group (AWG) Meeting of China-Mexico Inter-governmental Standing Committee in Beijing on April 5, 2012. Vice Minister Niu Dun and Dr. Pedro Brajcich Gallegos, Director General of the Mexican National Institute of Forestry, Agriculture, and Livestock Research (INIFAP) of the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGAR) led their respective agricultural delegations to attend the Meeting. Initiated in 2004, the Inter-governmental Standing Committee aims at guiding and coordinating bilateral cooperation and reducing conflicts over trade and investment. Both sides reviewed and evaluated the progress in agricultural cooperation between China and Mexico. Both agreed that, with joint efforts, China-Mexico agricultural cooperation witnessed increasing number of mutual visits, smooth agricultural S&T exchange, and agricultural trade growth. Both sides recognized that in terms of future agricultural development and market demand, there is still greater potential for further cooperation. To this end, both sides expressed their willingness to make concerted efforts to tap cooperation potential based on mutual benefits and win-win outcomes. Both sides briefed their achievements in recent years, development plans for the years ahead and related agricultural policies. Both were of the view that the exchange of agricultural development and related policies is beneficial to drawing on advantages from each other and boosting agricultural development. Both agreed to facilitate the signing of Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural Science and Technology Cooperation between INIFAP and the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS). The Memorandum aims to strengthen exchange and cooperation in the fields of prevention and control of animal and plant diseases and plant pests, climate change adaptation and agricultural bio-technology, germplasm exchange of corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco and other crops, as well as to hold the second Sino-Mexico Forum on Agricultural Science and Technology. The Meeting also reached consensus on an early signing of Agreement on Fishery Cooperation, inter alia to intensify cooperation in marine fishing, aquaculture, introduction of new species and fishery stock enhancement. Other issues discussed at the Meeting included creating favorable conditions for investment, granting appropriate preferential policies, and providing necessary service and facilitation measures so as to encourage and support eligible enterprises from both sides into agricultural trade and investment.

#### Engagement is zero-sum

Dowd ‘12

Alan Dowd, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, 2012, “Crisis in the America's,” <http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas>

Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Chinese influence in Latin America key to the global economy

Ellis 11

R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf>

Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chávez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur.The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country’s sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China’s attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used “against” Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

#### Nuclear war

Harris and Burrows ‘9

(Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf>, AM)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating** **crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

## case

#### Status quo solves

HLRCC 12 High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council, Executive Office of the President of the United States, “UNITED STATES-MEXICO HIGH-LEVEL REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL WORK PLAN,” 02/28/2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/united-states-mexico-high-level-regulatory-cooperation-council-work-plan.pdf

The fourth item on the HLRCC Work Plan involves the potential alignment of U.S. and ¶ Mexican policy approaches to oversight of applications of nanotechnology and nanomaterials. ¶ The relevant agencies are the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and the ¶ National Metrology Centre (CENAM).¶ Description: Mexico and the United States are in the process of developing principles and ¶ approaches to inform government oversight and regulation of nanotechnology applications and ¶ nanomaterials.¶ Objective/Desired Outcome: Share information and develop approaches on foundational ¶ regulatory elements, including terminology/nomenclature, information-gathering, and ¶ approaches to risk assessment and management. Develop initiatives to align regulatory ¶ approaches in specific areas, such that consistency exists for consumers and industry in Mexico ¶ and the United States.¶ 8¶ INEGI, National Accounts, January to August 2011. UNITED STATES-MEXICO High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council WORK Plan¶ 9¶ Specific Deliverables and Timeline: Specific deliverables identified in the Work Plan include: ¶  The United States will share with Mexico the list of regulators that were involved in ¶ the development of the general nanotechnology principles (accomplished by ¶ September 2011);¶  Response of Mexico’s relevant regulators to the U.S. Memorandum on “Policy ¶ Principles for the U.S. Decision-making Concerning Regulation and Oversight of ¶ Applications of Nanotechnology and Nanomaterials,” of June 9, 2011 (accomplished ¶ by October 2011);¶  Creation of a mechanism for exchanging information between the United States and ¶ Mexico on regulatory matters for nanotechnology applications and nanomaterials ¶ (accomplished by February 2012);¶  Share the advances of the Mexican side on potential principles on regulations for ¶ nanotechnology applications and nanomaterials (accomplished by February 2012);¶ and ¶  Engage in a dialogue to consider a possible model framework providing key elements ¶ and approaches to regulating nanotechnology applications and nanomaterials with ¶ respect to potential impacts on the environment, human health, labor, food or ¶ agriculture (by February 2013).¶

#### Nanotech reduces raw material demand—kills developing economies

Foladori 06

(professor in the Doctoral Program on Development Studies, Universidad ¶ Autónoma de Zacatecas, México, Guillermo, “Nanotechnology in Latin America ¶ at the Crossroads”, [http://www.estudiosdeldesarrollo.net/administracion/docentes/documentos\_personales/193983\_2\_International\_138[1].pdf](http://www.estudiosdeldesarrollo.net/administracion/docentes/documentos_personales/193983_2_International_138%5b1%5d.pdf)

Another problem concerning the disruptive nature of nanotechnologies is their impact on commerce. It is likely that raw materials will become cheaper as a consequence of their being substituted by ¶ nanotechnologies and a fall in demand. The publication of the Action Group on Erosion, Technology and ¶ Concentration (“ETC Group”), The Potential Impacts of Nano-Scale Technologies on Commodity ¶ Markets: The Implications for Commodity Dependent Developing Countries, studies the cases of the ¶ markets for rubber, platinum and copper. There are nanotechnological procedures that will substantially ¶ improve the durability of automobile tires, the main market for rubber, and this could significantly reduce ¶ the worldwide demand for the product. Carbon nanotubes could become an effective competitor for ¶ copper cables, greatly affecting worldwide demand for this product. Platinum could be replaced by ¶ nanotechnology as a catalyst in converters, batteries, and other products. These are some examples of the ¶ pressure that countries which sell these raw materials will face when they begin to be substituted by ¶ nanotechnology products. The publication concludes as follows: ¶ Without critical planning and assessment, commodity dependent developing countries are ¶ more likely to be on the receiving end of nanotech’s potentially adverse impacts—rather ¶ than active participants in shaping nanotech’s role in society.49 There is also the matter of unemployment. The latest report of the work group on science and ¶ technology of the United Nations Millennium Program considers nanotechnology to be more important to ¶ the developing world because, among other things, it means reduced work, land, and maintenance.50¶ However, the possibility of an increase in unemployment has not been considered by proponents of ¶ nanotechnology initiatives.

#### Market pressures and implementation hurdles decimate effectiveness

Spieler 07

(Jeff, chief of research, technology and utilization for the Office of Population and Reproductive Health at the US Agency for International Development was held recently at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars , “Nanotechnology and Health”, 02/2007, <http://www.anythingbutwork.com/health/nanotechnology.htm>

Measuring one billionth of a meter, one nanometer is a fraction the average width of a human hair (about 100 000 nanometers). Nanotechnology is the ability to measure, see, manipulate and manufacture objects between one and 100 nanometers.¶ Dr. Peter A. Singer, senior scientist at the McLaughlin-Rotman Centre for Global Health and Professor of Medicine at University of Toronto said:¶ "Nanotechnology has the potential to generate enormous health benefits for the more than five billion people living in the developing world. Nanotechnology might provide less-industrialized countries with powerful new tools for diagnosing and treating disease, and might increase the availability of clean water.¶ "But it remains to be seen whether novel applications of nanotechnology will deliver on their promise. A fundamental problem is that people are not engaged and are not talking to each other. Business has little incentive-as shown by the lack of new drugs for malaria, dengue fever and other diseases that disproportionately affect people in developing countries-to invest in the appropriate nanotechnology research targeted at the developing world. Government foreign assistance agencies do not often focus, or focus adequately, on science and technology. With scant public awareness of nanotechnology in any country, there are few efforts by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community groups to examine how nanotechnology could be directed toward, for example, improving public health in the developing world."¶ Previous research by Dr Singer's group identified nanotechnology applications relating to energy, agricultural productivity, water supply, and diagnosis and treatment of disease as having most immediate relevance to the developing world. Researchers also highlighted a surprising amount of innovative nanotechnology R&D in a number of developing countries.¶ Dr. Andrew Maynard, chief science advisor for the Woodrow Wilson Center's Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies commented:¶ "Countries like Brazil, India, China and South Africa have significant nanotechnology research initiatives that could be directed toward the particular needs of the poor. But there is still a danger-if market forces are the only dynamic-that small minorities of people in wealthy nations will benefit from nanotechnology breakthroughs in the health sector, while large majorities, mainly in the developing world, will not. Responsible development of nanotechnology must include benefits for people in both rich and poor nations and at relatively low cost. This also requires that careful attention be paid to possible risks nanotechnology poses for human health and the environment."¶ Dr. Piotr Grodzinski, director of the Nanotechnology Alliance for Cancer at the National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health said:¶ "It is my belief that nanomaterials and nanomedical devices will play increasingly critical and beneficial roles in improving the way we diagnose, treat, and ultimately prevent cancer and other diseases. But we face challenges; the complexity of clinical implementation and the treatment cost may cause gradual, rather than immediate, distribution of these novel yet effective approaches.

#### Farming innovations lead to Middle Eastern oil independence

Lugar 2K (Richard, Senator from Indiana, “Plant Power,” <http://www.unep.org/OurPlanet/imgversn/143/lugar.html>, JS)

The United States can take a leading position in a productivity revolution. And our success at increasing food production may play a decisive humanitarian role in the survival of billions of people and the health of our planet.

Directly related to our challenge to feed a growing world is the necessity of providing a sustainable resource for fuels, chemicals and materials. I believe that agriculture and the wider sphere of plants represent a resource not only for food, but also for the fuel, energy and materials essential to modern society. Scientists have developed biotechnologies – genetically engineered yeasts, enzymes and bacteria – capable of breaking down plants, trees, grasses and agricultural residues (known as biomass) into their constituent chemical building blocks, principally in the form of complex sugars. From this intermediate step, we can produce a wide variety of bio-based products including animal feed, chemicals and – importantly – fuel.

If a significant percentage of products currently derived from petroleum can be produced from biomass, the major industrial economies will improve their strategic security by reducing their dependence on Middle Eastern oil and all countries, rich and poor, can spend far less on oil imports, dramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help strengthen their own rural communities while simultaneously building a new bio-based industry worth hundreds of billions of dollars worldwide per year.

#### Energy independence collapses U.S. security guarantees–causes international realignment

Hulbert 8/19/12

(Matthew, senior fellow at the Clingendael International Energy Programme, The Hague, Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, focusing on international energy security and political risk, “America Will Deeply Regret Its Fixation On Energy Independence,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/08/19/why-america-will-deeply-regret-us-energy-independence/2/>)

No one should blame, or bemoan the U.S. for doing this. It’s entirely up to the U.S. whichever path they chose to take. You could even argue it’s exactly what Washington should be doing to create serious foreign policy optionality: pick and choose whatever it does where, when, and how for the rest of the world to fall back on. All fair enough, but the downside risk this presents to Washington has already been captured in the ‘Kuwait Question’: Would the U.S. take assertive action to secure some of the key producer states of the world, or would they now turn the cheek? We all know the U.S. is no longer dependent on Middle East supplies; it hasn’t been for a long time given it sources less than 15% of its oil from the sand. But we also know that the decision to underwrite MENA supplies is nothing to do with U.S. consumption – and everything to do with retaining a dominant global geopolitical role. Ensure that hydrocarbons globally flow to the East and West, and much else follows as the geo-economic and geo-political lynchpin of the world. Lose it, and you’ll be geopolitically downgraded quicker than credit analysts can get stuck into Greek debt. That’s before we consider where Gulf States decide to recycle their petrodollars in future. No security, no $? It’s certainly a question for the U.S. to ponder – not only in terms of who they are going to sell their Treasuries to, but what currency oil is priced in. Hence the bottom line for the U.S.; Middle East energy isn’t about oil for America, it’s ultimately about power. If the U.S. wasn’t part of the Gulf energy game, it would hold zero sway with Saudi, no powers of persuasion over Iranian nukes, no say in the Arab Awakening, or how Gulf Monarchies handle critical succession problems in future. Let alone shaping vested interests to promote and extend U.S. influence across the globe. American Credibility Gone? The problem for America is that doubts over U.S. credibility are already creeping in from the energy independence hype. No one expects the US to step back into Iraq to shore up supplies if things take a serious turn for the worse; nobody expects the U.S. to provide any serious state building measures in Sudan. Likewise strategic US interests in Central Asia now have more to do with American concerns over South Asia, rather than hydrocarbon provision. If Russia decided to re-exert its regional dominance over the Caucasus (circa 2008) the U.S. would be highly unlikely to take any assertive measures to the contrary. Such out-posts are seen as ‘nice to have’ assets for US geopolitical standing, not as crucial global oil interests for America to underwrite and secure. Under a ‘business as usual’ scenario, these gaps are only going to get wider from hereon in. Logic therefore dictates that consumers need a U.S. plan B, and fast. The good news is that China already has one. It’s expanding its international energy footprint in the Middle East, Africa, Russia, Central Asia, and Asia-Pacific, reaching as far as the Americas and UK North Sea to secure its energy needs, (and hedge price risk more effectively through equity stakes). As the second largest consumer of oil, and one of the most import dependent states, Beijing is well aware that it has to ensure its own security of supply over the next decade as the US winds down its hydrocarbon presence. China will become the number one geopolitical force in the world over the next twenty years, and will do so for one, very simple reason: securing global hydrocarbon supplies. Europe has been very slow to appreciate this, but is finally cottoning onto the idea that it’s useless merely talking to prospective suppliers adjacent to its borders. It needs to work hand in hand with consumers at the other end of the Eurasian pipeline – namely China – to ensure its own security of supply. As Beijing plays a more prominent energy role, European energy security will depend on its ability to exploit Chinese influence in Central Asia as a mutual ‘Beijing-Brussels’ hedge against Russia, while working towards a consumer driven market to enhance supplies from the Middle East & North Africa. Europe is far better served taking the scraps from China’s energy table rather than wishful thinking that the trans-Atlantic ‘energy relationship’ still holds good. Like it or not, the logical conclusion of U.S. energy independence is fundamental demand side realignment where new players fill new geopolitical gaps. Careful What You Wish For The snag is that while the U.S. is very happy to extol the virtues of energy independence, it hasn’t come close to accepting the downside geopolitical implications that holds. Instead of working out an orderly division of (G2) hydrocarbon labour with China in the Middle East as the key producing region of the world, Washington is doing all it can to contain the rise of China, and doing so in Asia-Pacific. No doubt some of the local markets welcome ongoing US presence (especially around the India Ocean), but ‘hard balancing’ between the U.S. and China in South Asia is a battle that America will only ever lose. Rather than sticking more fingers in the Asia-Pacific dyke, Washington would actually be better served keeping an eye on its own backyard. Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil and most notably Canada are doing all they can to diversify their export mix away from a saturated U.S. market. They all know relying on a single source of supply and single source of demand isn’t smart economics. They’re all looking to load tankers to sell oil and gas onto global markets, and especially in Asia where premium prices rest. If we take forecasts for the Americas seriously, the U.S. will not only lose global sway as the independence bug bites, it might also struggle to retain a dominant role in its own neighbourhood. Brazil could well end up joining OPEC as its production grows, Canada will play hardball with the U.S. over its Arctic assets (not to mention plugging any new tar plays into Asia) and even when Chavez eventually conks out, don’t expect his successor(s) to be any more pro-American than then Kirchner clan in Argentina. New found petro-states will not be traditional U.S. silos. America could very easily slip down the global league of geopolitical energy heavyweights. Some will say humbug. The background pieces are falling into place for a ‘grand bargain’ to be struck between the U.S. and China by trading mutual assets in the East and West. Make things simple and split the world in two, using the mid-Atlantic ridge as a proxy border. Beijing will concede all its assets across the Americas with West Africa put into the mix. In return, the U.S. would cede the Middle East, Caspian, East Africa and Australasia as a pure play Chinese energy concern. Obviously things are never going to be quite that clear cut, but it’s probably a better bet than the current collision course we’re on between the U.S. and China. If the U.S. keeps preaching its energy independence gospel, all while containing the rise of China, the day will eventually come when China presents itself as a geopolitical fait accompli against Washington, not just across Asia-Pacific, but the Middle East as well. Rather than letting things get that far, the US would be far better served by following through on its own energy independence mantra: step back from the geopolitical ‘frontline’, and use its new found resources to let China play a more prominent hydrocarbon role. That’s not just to defuse geopolitical bombs ticking between the U.S. and China, but to make sure China can take up some of the U.S. slack. If those gaps aren’t properly filled, everyone, including the U.S., will suffer. It’s either that, or America knocks the energy independence narrative on the head, assures (and re-assures) other consumers that Washington will not only work to keep energy as a fungible, free flowing commodity, but that it remains the ultimate geopolitical backstop to oil supplies in the most vital producing regions in the world. That would give America ongoing leverage over the international status of the dollar, and indeed geopolitical red lines that emerging markets can and can’t cross. But keep spinning the U.S. energy independence yarn (with associated passive and active political practice), then expect to lose global status as the geopolitical lynchpin of the hydrocarbon world. That would be a crying shame for America, not least because ‘total’ energy independence is a myth, especially in the form U.S. politicians (and over excited analysts) are currently peddling. America will sacrifice its global geopolitical role on a hollow dream; energy independence, far from a dream, will become a living nightmare for America’s role in the world. U.S. politicians should think long and hard about that part of the debate, or spend an eternity regretting their global fall from grace**.**

#### American power solves nuclear war and dampens all conflict

Barnett ‘11

Thomas, American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>, AM

Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, **the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known**. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would** now **be no** identifiable **human civilization left**, **once nuclear weapons entered the** killing **equation**. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace**. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered.

#### Reducing oil dependence cedes the Middle East to China, causes Saudi and general prolif, and collapses Saudi-Israeli relations.

**Black ‘9**

(Major Chris, master’s program at the Joint Forces Staff College, “Post Oil America and a renewable energy policy leads to the abrogation of the Middle East to China.,” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA530125&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, AM)

In the quest to reduce the consumption of oil, the US is failing to see the larger impact of a renewable energy policy. Reverse engineering over 60 years of policy, strategy, diplomacy, and military efforts to ensure the free flow and access to oil will inevitably cause a “vacuum” of American access, presence, and influence in a highly volatile region; raise the specter of larger militaries; cause an increasing need for nuclear weapons; shift security and cooperation guarantees; and disrupt the US economy and foreign policy. The implementation of a renewable energy policy begins to shift US prominence in the Persian Gulf to one dominated by China, resulting in US loss of strategic access and influence in an already volatile region. China presently practices a pure form of realpolitik in the region as they do not demand much of their energy suppliers nor care about the attendant politics of the region so long as they have a reliable oil stream. Saudi Arabia, as the largest producer of oil and keeper of the Islamic faith, will look to maintain their hold on power and will recognize the shift from the US to China and with it their security umbrella that has been provided by the US. Saudi Arabia will be happy to increase their relationship with China as that not only brings them large revenues for their national budget, it also brings a “no questions asked” policy of arms purchases and a lack of concern over Saudi’s domestic policies, their quest for nuclear weapons, or their stance towards Israel. As the US weans itself from oil it will accelerate the already occurring geopolitical shift in the Middle East from a region dominated by the United States to one that will be dominated by China. As a result of this shift, the US will lose access and influence in the region and realignments will occur among nation states leading the Saudis to grow their military and accelerate their quest for nuclear weapons. Unencumbered by the US, Saudi Arabian domestic policies will shift towards the more extreme versions of Wahhabism, leading towards an even harder stance towards Israel.

#### Saudi prolif causes nuclear war.

Edelman ‘11

(Jan/Feb, Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

#### Neoliberalism solves inequality and poverty in Latin America

Haslam ‘12

School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa (Paul Alexander Haslam, “Globalization in Latin America and Its Critics” International Studies Association, Volume 14, Issue 2, June 19 2012, Wiley Online Library)

After 30 years of liberal economic reforms and deeper integration into the world economy, is Latin America better-off? Many observers point to the poverty, exclusion, inequality, and disempowerment that continue to characterize the region. But the most recent figures suggest that the last decade has seen significant improvements in both poverty and inequality. In 1990, the percentage of indigent and non-indigent poor in Latin America stood at 48.3% of the population—some 200 million people. Twelve years later in 2002, the poor had declined to 44%, but due to population growth, the number of poor had increased to 221 million people. By 2009, the last year for which figures are available, the indigent and non-indigent poor had declined to 32.1% of the population, or 183 million people. These recent numbers are significantly lower, in percentage terms, than pre-crisis Latin America, circa 1980. Even the global financial crisis of 2008 only added 3 million more people to the ranks of the poor (Economic Commission for Latin America, the Caribbean (ECLAC) 2010:11). Inequality has also declined over the 2002–2009 period, with the Gini coefficient falling slightly and the income gap narrowing in the vast majority of countries (ibid.:15). The story of the last decade, therefore, has been relatively effective poverty and inequality reduction in Latin America—at the same time that the region has deepened its integration with the world economy. The reasons for this turnaround, and the sustainability of the changes, are important subjects of debate. Something has changed in the region. Some cite the rise of the new left, macro-economic stability, and the commodity boom that has swelled government coffers. Others claim that politics has also become more authentically representative, social programs are being better targeted on the poor, and the education gap has diminished.

#### Neoliberalism key to widespread and effective disease treatment – regulations inhibit companies

Ralston’ 3

Executive director of Americans for Free Choice in Medicine Richard E. Ralston “Free Markets: The Key to New Drugs at a Reasonable Price” 2003 <http://www.freedomfromfda.org/freemarketskey.html>

Government control of prescriptions drugs and their prices would blow up the pipeline of the new medications that have significantly improved the lives of millions of Americans. The U.S. pharmaceutical industry spends $22 billion a year on research and development of new drugs. Unlike government-funded research—which can be spent to develop drugs that no one needs or that duplicate existing drugs—pharmaceutical companies must get results. In order to recover their investment, their new drugs actually have to work. The continuing flow of new drugs that these firms produce is the best hope we have to treat and cure our ailments. Senator Edward Kennedy is a longtime advocate of government-run health care and he has serious long-term plans for government intervention in the medical profession. Kennedy, who co-sponsored the HMO Act of 1973, which instituted subsidies for HMOs, is the person most responsible for the Senate’s Medicare prescription drug plan and he has made it clear that drug subsidies for seniors are the first step toward government control of medicine. Kennedy’s stated priority for the next step in this process is government control of prescription drug prices. In addition to discovering and testing drugs, pharmaceutical companies also face enormous administrative costs to obtain FDA approval to put drugs on the market. Hospitals and physicians who dispense drugs also absorb the high cost of complying with a dizzying array of government regulations. If drug firms know that a drug’s price is established by the state—not by patients—there is no interest in discovering, testing and creating new drugs. Drug prices have gone up because demand for better drugs has gone up. Drugs that provide astonishing new relief or a cure are priced high enough to recover development costs and provide capital for more effective research. Yes, scientists working hard to develop new drugs make a lot of money—and they should. They deserve it. A free market in pharmaceuticals is the only way to insure the flow of new, breakthrough drugs and competitive pricing. An authentically free market means other companies—anywhere in the world—are free to develop drugs that are equally or more effective, or competitors who produce similar drugs that are almost as effective at a lower price. Controls on drugs, doctors, and prices will distort the drug market from the science stage to the pricing stage. Congress must face the fact that its laws cannot create a single new drug and that government force will only restrict and inhibit the scientist seeking new medicines. Advocates of government-controlled medicine, such as Senator Kennedy, assume that any new drug brought to market—at whatever cost—must be provided by those who produce it to anyone who wants it at a price determined by government decree. According to this view, the government, and only the government, should supply each of our most basic needs. The result will be a nation of people dependent on government handouts for all essential requirements of life—hardly the republic of free, prosperous individuals the Founding Fathers envisioned. But even the pathetic prospect of the American people lining up for government drugs will not reverse the laws of cause and effect: great minds—including those working in science, medicine and pharmaceutical research—will not work under coercion and neither President Bush nor Senator Kennedy nor their state-sponsored prescription drug coverage will insure a continuing development of effective new medication. Americans who cherish their freedom, particularly seniors who treasure their independence, must reply to the threat of government prescription drugs with the only appropriate response: Leave my drugs—which means those who produce them—alone!

**Neoliberalism is key to hegemony**

**Cafruny ‘8**

Alan, Professor of IR (“The ‘Imperial Turn’ and the Future of US Hegemony: ‘Terminal’ Decline or Retrenchment?,” All Academic)

The role played by U.S. structural financial power in the construction of Europe’s neoliberal project has been analyzed by many scholars (Helleiner, 1994; Gowan, 1999; Seabrooke, 2001; Baker, 2003); Panitch and Gindin, 2005; Cafruny and Ryner, 2007a; Ryner, 2007). However, the relationship between **neoliberalism** and **geopolitics** has received less attention. In the first part of this chapter I discuss the role of U.S. military power as it has served, in tandem with U.S. structural financial power, to consolidate the turn to neoliberalism in Europe. Beginning in the mid-1990s the United States transformed NATO from a containment-oriented and defensive alliance to an instrument designed to promote the forward expansion of American power across the European continent and into central Asia. This reinforced Europe’s geopolitical dependence on the United States and buttressed neoliberal social forces across the continent. In the second part of the chapter I consider the long-range possibilities for the United States and Europe in view of growing challenges to U.S. power in both its geoeconomic and geopolitical dimensions. The uncertain status of the dollar is the natural accompaniment to relative industrial decline and the transnationalization of production even as U.S. **hegemony has been prolonged** through **financial deregulation** and a resultant series of bubbles. In this context the Bush administration’s policy of geopolitical advance and militarization, designed in part to maintain its hold over global energy resources, is a compensatory strategy (Harvey, 2003) that has, however, encountered substantial costs and risks. Notwithstanding the deepening crisis of the U.S. imperium, the possibilities for a European challenge are sharply circumscribed by its subordinate participation within a U.S.-led neoliberal transnational financial order and its related inability to develop an autonomous regional security structure. U.S. power in both its structural financial and military dimensions has been central to the construction and consolidation of a European neoliberalism. It has not, however, led to transnational class formation or the suppression of inter-imperialist rivalry either at the Atlantic level or within the European Union. **Neoliberal ideology** cements national capitalist classes together in an organic **alliance** under a declining but still minimally **hegemonic U.S. superpower**. From within the framework of this intersubjective agreement the United States continues to provide collective goods in the form of liquidity, trade openness, and military security, albeit very much on its own terms as it externalizes its own problems and social contradictions into the international system. In the eurozone mercantilist rivalry has been displaced from the sphere of national monetary policy to “structural labor reform” and, intermittently, fiscal policy.

**Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality**

Cummiskey 90– Professor of Philosophy, Bates David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical considerat

ion to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### Ethical policymaking requires calculation of consequences

Gvosdev 5 – Rhodes scholar, PhD from St. Antony’s College, executive editor of The National Interest; Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmuse,

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

#### Predictions and scenario building are valuable for decision-making, even if they’re not perfect

**Garrett 12**

Banning, In Search of Sand Piles and Butterflies, director of the Asia Program and Strategic Foresight Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

http://www.acus.org/disruptive\_change/search-sand-piles-and-butterflies

“Disruptive change” that produces “strategic shocks” has become an increasing concern for policymakers, shaken by momentous events of the last couple of decades that were not on their radar screens – from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the 2008 financial crisis and the “Arab Spring.” These were all shocks to the international system, predictable perhaps in retrospect but predicted by very few experts or officials on the eve of their occurrence. This “failure” to predict specific strategic shocks does not mean we should abandon efforts to foresee disruptive change or look at all possible shocks as equally plausible. Most strategic shocks do not “come out of the blue.” We can understand and project long-term global trends and foresee at least some of their potential effects, including potential shocks and disruptive change. We can construct alternative futures scenarios to envision potential change, including strategic shocks. Based on trends and scenarios, we can take actions to avert possible undesirable outcomes or limit the damage should they occur. We can also identify potential opportunities or at least more desirable futures that we seek to seize through policy course corrections. We should distinguish “strategic shocks” that are developments that could happen at any time and yet may never occur. This would include such plausible possibilities as use of a nuclear device by terrorists or the emergence of an airborne human-to-human virus that could kill millions. Such possible but not inevitable developments would not necessarily be the result of worsening long-term trends. Like possible terrorist attacks, governments need to try to prepare for such possible catastrophes though they may never happen. But there are other potential disruptive changes, including those that create strategic shocks to the international system, that can result from identifiable trends that make them more likely in the future—for example, growing demand for food, water, energy and other resources with supplies failing to keep pace. We need to look for the “sand piles” that the trends are building and are subject to collapse at some point with an additional but indeterminable additional “grain of sand” and identify the potential for the sudden appearance of “butterflies” that might flap their wings and set off hurricanes. Mohamed Bouazizi, who immolated himself December 17, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, was the butterfly who flapped his wings and (with the “force multiplier” of social media) set off a hurricane that is still blowing throughout the Middle East. Perhaps the metaphors are mixed, but the butterfly’s delicate flapping destabilized the sand piles (of rising food prices, unemployed students, corrupt government, etc.) that had been building in Tunisia, Egypt, and much of the region. The result was a sudden collapse and disruptive change that has created a strategic shock that is still producing tremors throughout the region. But the collapse was due to cumulative effects of identifiable and converging trends. When and what form change will take may be difficult if not impossible to foresee, but the likelihood of a tipping point being reached—that linear continuation of the present into the future is increasingly unlikely—can be foreseen. Foreseeing the direction of change and the likelihood of discontinuities, both sudden and protracted, is thus not beyond our capabilities. While efforts to understand and project long-term global trends cannot provide accurate predictions, for example, of the GDPs of China, India, and the United States in 2030, looking at economic and GDP growth trends, can provide insights into a wide range of possible outcomes. For example, it is a useful to assess the implications if the GDPs of these three countries each grew at currently projected average rates – even if one understands that there are many factors that can and likely will alter their trajectories. The projected growth trends of the three countries suggest that at some point in the next few decades, perhaps between 2015 and 2030, China’s GDP will surpass that of the United States. And by adding consideration of the economic impact of demographic trends (China’s aging and India’s youth bulge), there is a possibility that India will surpass both China and the US, perhaps by 2040 or 2050, to become the world’s largest economy. These potential shifts of economic power from the United States to China then to India would likely prove strategically disruptive on a global scale. Although slowly developing, such disruptive change would likely have an even greater strategic impact than the Arab Spring. The “rise” of China has already proved strategically disruptive, creating a potential China-United States regional rivalry in Asia two decades after Americans fretted about an emerging US conflict with a then-rising Japan challenging American economic supremacy. Despite uncertainty surrounding projections, foreseeing the possibility (some would say high likelihood) that China and then India will replace the United States as the largest global economy has near-term policy implications for the US and Europe. The potential long-term shift in economic clout and concomitant shift in political power and strategic position away from the US and the West and toward the East has implications for near-term policy choices. Policymakers could conclude, for example, that the West should make greater efforts to bring the emerging (or re-emerging) great powers into close consultation on the “rules of the game” and global governance as the West’s influence in shaping institutions and behavior is likely to significantly diminish over the next few decades. The alternative to finding such a near-term accommodation could be increasing mutual suspicions and hostility rather than trust and growing cooperation between rising and established powers—especially between China and the United States—leading to a fragmented, zero-sum world in which major global challenges like climate change and resource scarcities are not addressed and conflict over dwindling resources and markets intensifies and even bleeds into the military realm among the major actors. Neither of these scenarios may play out, of course. Other global trends suggest that sometime in the next several decades, the world could encounter a “hard ceiling” on resources availability and that climate change could throw the global economy into a tailspin, harming China and India even more than the United States. In this case, perhaps India and China would falter economically leading to internal instability and crises of governance, significantly reducing their rates of economic growth and their ability to project power and play a significant international role than might otherwise have been expected. But this scenario has other implications for policymakers, including dangers posed to Western interests from “failure” of China and/or India, which could produce huge strategic shocks to the global system, including a prolonged economic downturn in the West as well as the East. Thus, looking at relatively slowly developing trends can provide foresight for necessary course corrections now to avert catastrophic disruptive change or prepare to be more resilient if foreseeable but unavoidable shocks occur. Policymakers and the public will press for predictions and criticize government officials and intelligence agencies when momentous events “catch us by surprise.” But unfortunately, as both Yogi Berra and Neils Bohr are credited with saying, “prediction is very hard, especially about the future.” One can predict with great accuracy many natural events such as sunrise and the boiling point of water at sea level. We can rely on the infallible predictability of the laws of physics to build airplanes and automobiles and iPhones. And we can calculate with great precision the destruction footprint of a given nuclear weapon. Yet even physical systems like the weather as they become more complex, become increasingly difficult and even inherently impossible to predict with precision. With human behavior, specific predictions are not just hard, but impossible as uncertainty is inherent in the human universe. As futurist Paul Saffo wrote in the Harvard Business Review in 2007, “prediction is possible only in a world in which events are preordained and no amount of actions in the present can influence the future outcome.” One cannot know for certain what actions he or she will take in the future much less the actions of another person, a group of people or a nation state. This obvious point is made to dismiss any idea of trying to “predict” what will occur in the future with accuracy, especially the outcomes of the interplay of many complex factors, including the interaction of human and natural systems. 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# 2NC

## Impact framing

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## 2nc squo solves

#### Merida solves in the squo

Barker et al. 11[Todd F. Barker, a Partner at Meridian Institute with more than 15 years designing and managing collaborative problem solving processes. Mr. Barker has worked extensively on issues related to science and technology, including the implications of emerging technologies such as nanotechnology and biotechnology for developing countries, Leili Fatehi, is a graduate student at the University of Minnesota School of Law and Editor-in-Chief of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology. She was a Research Assistant and the Editor of Nanotechnology and Development News at Meridian Institute from 2005 to 2008, Michael T. Lesnick, a founder and Senior Partner of the Meridian Institute, Timothy J Mealey, serves as a convener, facilitator, and mediator of multi-party policy dialogues, negotiations, and collaborative problem solving processes on a wide variety of national and international environmental and sustainable development issues—including issues related to nanotechnology research, development and utilization, Rex R. Raimond, is a Senior Mediator at Meridian Institute where he designs and manages collaborative problem solving processes aimed at helping people solve complex and controversial societal problems, “Nanotechnology and the poor: opportunities and risks for Developing countries”, Nanotechnology and the Challenges of Equity, Equality, and Development

To address this need, Meridian Institute, a non-proﬁt organization that specializes in helping people solve problems and make informed decisions about complex and controversial societal issues,1 has convened the Global Dialogue on Nanotechnology and the Poor: Opportunities and Risks (GDNP) to close these gaps through a variety of strategies that raise awareness about the implications of nanotechnology for developing countries, catalyze actions that address speciﬁc opportunities and risks, and identify ways that science and technology can play an appropriate role in the development process. As part of the GDNP process, Meridian is convening a series of sector-speciﬁc activities, beginning with the International Workshop on Nanotechnology, Water, and Development, held October 2006 in Chennai, India. This workshop brought together participants from developed and developing countries and with a broad range of perspectives and expertise to discuss the range of challenges people in developing countries may face when developing and implementing strategies for improving access to clean water and opportunities for using nanotechnology to address water supply challenges, as well as risks, and other issues that need to be addressed in relation to speciﬁc nanotechnology applications. Meridian plans to convene other sector-focused workshops in the areas of commodities (agricultural, mineral, and non-fuel commodities), energy, and health care.

#### Development isn’t competitive – it’s cooperative – proves global actors solve now

NanoTechWire ’10 “International Collaboration Boosts Nanotechnology Research” 12/12

<http://nanotechwire.com/news.asp?nid=11255>

Despite their initial focus on national economic competitiveness, the nanotechnology research initiatives now funded by more than 60 countries have become increasingly collaborative, with nearly a quarter of all papers co-authored by researchers across borders. Researchers from the two leading producers of nanotechnology papers -- China and the United States -- have become each nation's most frequent international co-authors. Though Chinese and U.S. researchers now publish roughly the same number of nanotechnology papers, the U.S. retains a lead in the quality of publications -- as measured by the number of early citations. "Despite ten years of emphasis by governments on national nanotechnology initiatives, we find that patterns of nanotechnology research collaboration and funding transcend country boundaries," said Phillip Shapira, study co-author and a professor in the School of Public Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology. "For example, we found that U.S. and Chinese researchers have developed a relatively high level of collaboration in nanotechnology research. Each country is the other's leading collaborator in nanotechnology R&D." The findings were part of a new study of nanotechnology publishing reported Dec. 2 in the online edition of the journal Nature. The research was sponsored by the National Science Foundation-supported Center for Nanotechnology in Society at Arizona State University (CNS-ASU). Sparked by programs such as the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in the United States, leading industrial nations have launched nanotechnology research programs that invested more than $8 billion in public funds in 2008 alone. China, Germany, Japan and Korea are among the many countries that have launched major governmental programs to develop their national nanotechnology capabilities as part of efforts to boost future economic growth. "There is widespread anticipation that nanotechnology will be a critical component in addressing global challenges in such areas as energy, environment, health care, security and sustainability," explained Shapira, who is also a professor of innovation at the University of Manchester. "At the same time, nanotechnology may be a key driver in the next wave of technology-led economic growth and investment. Governments around the world are hoping that their often massive investments in nanotechnology R&D will lead not only to economic, but also to significant societal returns." Though the revolutionary advances that nanotechnology promises are still off into the future, Shapira noted that the investments made so far have led to "a noticeable shift toward innovation in the past few years as companies are beginning to market a wide range of products and devices whose performance has been enhanced by nanoscale science and engineering."

#### Regulation plan already in place – aff isn’t inherent

White House 12 – Executive Office of the President of the United States

(“United States – Mexico High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Council Work Plan”, 2/28/2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/united-states-mexico-high-level-regulatory-cooperation-council-work-plan.pdf)

Nanotechnology The fourth item on the HLRCC Work Plan involves the potential alignment of U.S. and ¶ Mexican policy approaches to oversight of applications of nanotechnology and nanomaterials. ¶ The relevant agencies are the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and the ¶ National Metrology Centre (CENAM).¶ Description: Mexico and the United States are in the process of developing principles and ¶ approaches to inform government oversight and regulation of nanotechnology applications and ¶ nanomaterials.¶ Objective/Desired Outcome: Share information and develop approaches on foundational ¶ regulatory elements, including terminology/nomenclature, information-gathering, and ¶ approaches to risk assessment and management. Develop initiatives to align regulatory ¶ approaches in specific areas, such that consistency exists for consumers and industry in Mexico ¶ and the United States. Specific Deliverables and Timeline: Specific deliverables identified in the Work Plan include: • The United States will share with Mexico the list of regulators that were involved in the development of the general nanotechnology principles (accomplished by September 2011); • Response of Mexico’s relevant regulators to the U.S. Memorandum on “Policy Principles for the U.S. Decision-making Concerning Regulation and Oversight of Applications of Nanotechnology and Nanomaterials,” of June 9, 2011 (accomplished by October 2011); • Creation of a mechanism for exchanging information between the United States and Mexico on regulatory matters for nanotechnology applications and nanomaterials (accomplished by February 2012); • Share the advances of the Mexican side on potential principles on regulations for nanotechnology applications and nanomaterials (accomplished by February 2012); and • Engage in a dialogue to consider a possible model framework providing key elements and approaches to regulating nanotechnology applications and nanomaterials with respect to potential impacts on the environment, human health, labor, food or agriculture (by February 2013).

## Neolib good

#### Neolib doesn’t increase poverty—solves it in Mexico though

Walton ‘4

Michael – Lecturer in Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, Senior Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, Delhi. He was V.K.R.V. Rao Chair Professor, Institute of Social and Economic Change, Bangalore, “NEOLIBERALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: Good, Bad, or Incomplete?”, October 2004; http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/larr/prot/fulltext/vol39no3/walton.pdf

The region’s high and persistent income inequality is of direct concern to citizens (Latinobarómetro 2002), increases poverty, and is probably a source of lower aggregate development (for a review, see De Ferranti et al. 2004). The most striking fact is the resilience of high inequality, through many different policy regimes over the past few decades. As table 2 shows, the 1970s saw some tendency for mild reductions in inequality, and the 1980s a more marked tendency for increased inequality in the context of macroeconomic difficulties. The 1990s has seen a more mixed picture: more countries experienced increases than declines in inequality, but there is no overall pattern. Most striking has been Argentina’s very large rise before and during the crisis; though Mexico actually experienced a slight decline in inequality in its crisis, and Brazil a modest but significant distributional improvement over the decade.

#### Prefer our evidence – theirs ignores STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT data proving neoliberalism solves poverty

Mishkin ‘6

PhD in Economics, Professor of Economics @ Columbia

(Frederic, “The Next Great Globalization: How Disadvantaged Nations Can Harness Their Financial Systems to Get Rich,” Ch 1)

Have the participants in this new Age of Globalization experienced the good economic outcomes and the reduction of poverty associated with the previous Age of Globalization? Data suggest that they have. World economic growth from 1960 to today has been at the highest pace in the history of the world: world income per person has been rising at a 2% annual rate.18 Critics of globalization point out that income inequality across countries has grown and argue that for this reason globalization has not been good for the poor. But they have not looked carefully enough at the data. Income inequality across countries has risen only because, as in the period before World War I, those countries that have been active in global markets have grown very rapidly. Meanwhile those who have not (such as most countries in sub-Saharan Africa) have not only seen their position relative to globalizers fall but also experienced absolute drops in income per person. As before, the globalizers have won and the non-globalizers have lost. In 1960 the income of the average person in Somalia was 10% higher than that of his South Korean counterpart. Over the next forty-five years, Somalians experienced a drop in their income, so that Somalia’s income per person is now less than one-tenth that of South Korea’s: Somalia’s income per person decreased by 33% while South Korea’s increased by more than 1000%.19¶ What we have seen in this new Age of Globalization is a convergence of income per person among countries that have been able to take advantage of globalization by becoming export oriented. For this set of countries, income inequality has decreased; for the non-globalizers, it hasn’t.20 Furthermore, there is little evidence that globalization has increased income inequality within developing countries.21 (There has, however, been an increase in income inequality within rich countries in recent years that might be related to globalization.)22 Thus we are led to the same conclusion that we reached for the pre–World War I era: this new Age of Globalization has seen a reduction of poverty in developing countries that have been willing and able to globalize.¶ Another way of looking at the data also suggests that globalization has been associated with reductions in poverty. If, instead of looking at inequality across countries, where all countries are weighted equally, we instead look at inequality across the world population, where each person is weighted equally, we get a very different picture. The great success stories in recent years have been in Asia, which has two of the most populous countries in the world, India and China. Both countries came to globalization late and have sometimes used unorthodox methods to develop their economies, but their embrace of globalization has had high payoffs. Rapid growth in India and China has removed over a billion people from extreme poverty. When we realize that these billion make up a sixth of the world’s population, it becomes obvious why research that weights every human being equally in computing inequality finds that income inequality has actually fallen, not risen, in recent years.23 The great success stories of India and China in reducing poverty are reflected not just in economic data but also in life expectancy. In 1955 life expectancies in India and China were thirty-nine and forty-one years, respectively; today they have risen to sixty-two years in India and seventy years in China.24¶ These success stories are not meant to minimize the terrible plight of certain parts of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa, where poverty has increased and life expectancy has actually fallen to disastrously low levels in recent years because of the AIDS epidemic. (Those in poverty, defined as having income of less than $2 per day, rose from 73% of the population to over 76% today, while life expectancy has dropped from fifty years in 1990 to less than forty-six years currently.)25 The plight of these countries, however, is due not to globalization but rather to the failure to globalize. This observation has been cogently expressed by economists Peter Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson: “As far as we can tell, there are no anti-global victories to report for the postwar Third World.”26¶ A word of caution: The association of the reduction in poverty with countries that have globalized could be the result of reverse causality. That is, countries that had the capability to grow fast were also the ones that could take advantage of globalization. Evidence and analysis presented later in this book, however, suggest that causality is likely to run from globalization to high economic growth and reductions in poverty.¶ Financial Globalization in Emerging Market Economies: The Next Great Globalization?¶ Although economic globalization has come a long way, in one particular dimension it is far from complete. As is documented in Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor’s book, Global Capital Markets, financial globalization is primarily confined to rich countries.27 Despite the huge increase in international capital flows in recent years, they primarily flow from North to North, that is, from rich countries to other rich countries that are mostly in the Northern Hemisphere, rather than from North to South, from rich to poor countries.28 Most international capital flows are exchanges of assets between rich countries and are undertaken primarily for diversification. These flows enable people in rich countries to put their eggs into different baskets by holding assets from other rich countries. International capital does not generally flow to poor countries to enhance their development.¶ As Nobel laureate Robert Lucas has pointed out, this feature of international capital flows is a paradox: Why doesn’t capital flow from rich to poor countries?29 We know that labor is incredibly cheap in poor countries, and so we might think that capital would be especially productive there. Just think of how hugely profitable a factory might be in a poor country where wages are one-tenth of what they are in the United States. We should expect massive flows of capital from rich countries (where the returns on capital should be far lower) to poor countries (where they should be higher). While there has been a big increase in the amount of capital moving to emerging market countries in recent years, capital still flows primarily from one rich country to another, where the returns on capital are similar.30¶ The amount of private capital flowing to emerging market countries increased dramatically in the 1990s, and its annual rate is now over $300 billion. That may sound like a lot, but it is only one-fifth of total international capital flows from private sources.31 When governments are added into the picture, recent developments are even more surprising. Emerging market countries have actually been sending capital back to rich countries. The United States is currently running enormous trade and current account deficits of over $600 billion because Americans are buying more goods and services from other countries than they are selling to other countries. These deficits are being financed by loans from foreigners, with emerging market countries providing the United States with about $200 billion per year. The Chinese government, for example, has accumulated almost $800 billion of foreign assets, and it is now one of the largest holders of U.S. Treasury securities in the world.¶ Also remarkable is the finding that capital flows from North to South relative to total capital flows are far smaller than they were in the first Age of Globalization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By 1914 around half of the capital in Argentina was supplied by rich foreign countries, particularly Great Britain.32 Today less than one-tenth of Argentine capital is being supplied by foreigners.33 This change in the pattern of capital flows has not been confined to Argentina. In 1913 over 25% of the world stock of foreign capital went to countries with income per person less than one-fifth that of the United States; by 1997 this figure had fallen to around 5%.34¶ As these numbers show, financial globalization is far from complete. Will financial systems in emerging market economies become more integrated with those in the rest of the world? Will the next great globalization be financial? If it is, will further financial globalization benefit poorer countries?¶ Is Financial Globalization Always Beneficial?¶ The benefits of globalization of trade in goods and services are not a controversial subject among economists. Polls of economists indicate that one of the few things they agree on is that the globalization of international trade, in which markets are opened to flows of foreign goods and services, is desirable.35 (Globalization of trade is, however, controversial among the general public and more will be said about it in Chapters 8 and 12.) Financial globalization, opening markets to flows of foreign capital, is, however, highly controversial even among economists.

#### Turns the case

Beckley ‘12

Michael, Assistant professor of political science at Tufts, research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School's. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited,” PhD dissertation, AM

One danger is that declinism could prompt trade conflicts and immigration restrictions. The results of this study suggest that the United States benefits immensely from the free flow of goods, services, and people around the globe; this is what allows American corporations to specialize in high-­‐value activities, exploit innovations created elsewhere, and lure the brightest minds to the United States, all while reducing the price of goods for U.S. consumers. Characterizing China’s export expansion as a loss for the United States is not just bad economics; it blazes a trail for jingoistic and protectionist policies. It would be tragically ironic if Americans reacted to false prophecies of decline by cutting themselves off from a potentially vital source of American power. Another danger is that declinism may impair foreign policy decision-­‐making. If top government officials come to believe that China is overtaking the United States, they are likely to react in one of two ways, both of which are potentially disastrous. The first is that policymakers may imagine the United States faces a closing “window of opportunity” and should take action “while it still enjoys preponderance and not wait until the diffusion of power has already made international politics more competitive and unpredictable.”315 This belief may spur positive action, but it also invites parochial thinking, reckless behavior, and preventive war.316 As Robert Gilpin and others have shown, “hegemonic struggles have most frequently been triggered by fears of ultimate decline and the perceived erosion of power.”317 By fanning such fears, declinists may inadvertently promote the type of violent overreaction that they seek to prevent. The other potential reaction is retrenchment – the divestment of all foreign policy obligations save those linked to vital interests, defined in a narrow and national manner. Advocates of retrenchment assume, or hope, that the world will sort itself out on its own; that whatever replaces American hegemony, whether it be a return to balance-­‐of-­‐power politics or a transition to a post-­‐power paradise, will naturally maintain international order and prosperity. But order and prosperity are unnatural. They can never be presumed. When achieved, they are the result of determined action by powerful actors and, in particular, by the most powerful actor, which is, and will be for some time, the United States. Arms buildups, insecure sea-­‐lanes, and closed markets are only the most obvious risks of U.S. retrenchment. Less obvious are transnational problems, such as global warming, water scarcity, and disease, which may fester without a leader to rally collective action.

#### Neoliberalism is the lynchpin of American hegemony

Dumenil and Levy ‘7

EconomiX-CNRS and PSE-CNRS (Gerard and Dominique, “Neoliberal Dynamics – Imperial Dynamics”, 5/25/7; http://www.raumplanung.tu-dortmund.de/irpud/presom/fileadmin/docs/presom/external/WS\_Paris\_June\_2007/Dumenil\_Levy.pdf)

The financial hegemony, as in neoliberalism, corresponds to the new functionings of capitalism both domestically and internationally, with somewhat specific contents. Therefore, a distinction must be maintained between neoliberalism and globalization. Domestically, the neoliberal order is manifest in the discipline imposed to labor and management, and the new flows of income toward finance. The same is true internationally, though, as recalled above, free trade and the free movements of capital are crucial in the present functionings and transformation of the world economy. The main issue, from the 1990s onward, became the globalization of neoliberalism toward the periphery, i.e. , the extension of the hunting ground of international capital. By imperialism , we do not mean a stage of capitalism, as in Lenin's analysis 6 , but the relationship of subordination and exploitation which relates the countries of the periphery to the most advanced countries. (Imperialism itself undergoes successive stages in relation to the economical, social, and political features of the countries of the center and the periphery in each epoch of capitalism.) This domination and exploitation | whose eld is the international economy, and in which the interests of the ruling classes of each country are expressed by what remains \their" states, with potential rivalry | interacts with domestic patterns of exploitation in various controls and regulations that we cannot address here. Violence is always at issue within imperialist relations. Beyond the direct exercise of violence, the “simple" establishment of economic relationships between countries of very unequal development conveys, in itself, domination and exploitation. \Free trade" is already a vector of potential devastation. \Fair trade" among such countries would require a whole set of limitations and controls, at odd with the logic of capitalism. The system of imperialism also underwent important transformations. The major advanced capitalist countries are all engaged, under U.S. hegemony, in the preservation of their privileges in the World Economy. Since World War II, this imperial rule found its expression in constant and multifaceted actions, marked by two specific features: (1) the preservation and then unravelling of the traditional colonial patterns of domination and (2) the cold war. The disappearance of these two elements considerably modified and, in a sense, clarified the fundamental nature of imperialism. We give to hegemony a more speci c meaning (which echoes the historical antecedent of the league of Delos in ancient Greece) than that of domination. Imperialism is not the fact of a single country (the United States) but collective and hierarchical, in its relationship to other less developed countries and given the contradictions within the group of imperialist countries. This is what we precisely mean by hegemony. **The leadership is ensured by the United States and its grasp over the periphery is combined with a form of inter- imperialist domination within the group of imperialist countries.** (Obviously, the two levels of dominations are distinct in degrees and forms.) This is a simple framework of analysis, but crucial in the understanding of contemporary international power relationships. Incidentally, note that, referring to financial \hegemony", we give the same content to the notion, that of a two-tier domination process: the domination of finance over all capitalist classes and the collective rule over other classes. There are obviously political and military aspects to imperialism and hegemony, and this issue relates to the autonomy of the various states around the planet. Within international institutions, such as the United Nations, or military structures such as NATO, the hierarchy of powers is very strict. The United States control to a large extent the military power of Europe, and make constants e orts to secure such a coordinated military efficient order in various regions of the world. Although the definitions are distinct, there are obvious links between neoliberalism, globalization, and imperialism: 1. **A first illustration of this statement is that globalization, under its present forms, is a central aspect of neoliberalism and U.S. hegemony.** Besides the fall of the Soviet block, **the assertion of neoliberalism was a major factor in the strengthening of U.S. supremacy and, therefore, hegemony within imperialism, not their weakening**. Within the triad, both Europe and Japan were more a affected than the United States by the new course of capitalism. (This is due to structural reasons, notably the existence in Europe and Japan of models of development more at odds with neoliberal patterns: state intervention, importance of loans in the financing of investment, etc.) 2. It is analytically important to separate the configurations of power: (1) within class patterns and (2) between countries. For example, within neoliberalism, the former relates to financial hegemony and compromises; the latter, to the hierarchy among states. But these distinctions are not absolute. A first aspect of such overlapping patterns is that the state of the hegemonic power is obviously that of its ruling classes. A second aspect is that the world system of imperialism is also based on a class compromise among ruling classes of the United States, of other imperialist countries and Japan), and of countries of the periphery. For example, the ruling classes of countries of the periphery sold their public sector to transnational corporations; they freed the movements of their capitals to be able of exporting their capitals to the countries of the center, etc.

# 1NR

## Ptx ov

#### Lack of perfect knowledge doesn’t disprove need for action

Tyler **Cowen**, GMU, December **2006**, “The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism,” Utilitas, 18:4, pq

The epistemic critique relies heavily on a complete lack of information about initial circumstances. This is not a plausible general assumption, although it may sometimes be true. At the same time, the epistemic critique appears to be using a more plausible assumption, namely that of a high variance for the probability distribution of our estimates concerning the future. But simply increasing the level of variance or uncertainty does not add much force to the epistemic argument. The original force came from the assumption of no information about major events of consequence. To see this more clearly, consider another case of a high upfront benefit. Assume that the United States has been hit with a bioterror attack and one million children have contracted smallpox.We also have two new experimental remedies, both of which offer some chance of curing smallpox and restoring the children to perfect health. If we know for sure which remedy works, obviously we should apply that remedy. But imagine now that we are uncertain as to which remedy works. The uncertainty is so extreme that each remedy may cure somewhere between 300,000 and 600,000 children. Nonetheless we have a slight idea that one remedy is better than the other. That is, one remedy is slightly more likely to cure more children, with no other apparent offsetting negative effects or considerations. Despite the greater uncertainty, we still have the intuition that we should try to save as many children as possible. We should apply the remedy that is more likely to cure more children. We do not say: ‘We are now so uncertain about what will happen. We should pursue some goal other than trying to cure as many children as possible.’ Nor would we cite greater uncertainty about longer-run events as an argument against curing the children. We have a definite good in the present (more cured children), balanced against a radical remixing of the future on both sides of the equation. The definite upfront good still stands firm. Alternatively, let us assume that our broader future suddenly became less predictable (perhaps genetic engineering is invented, which creates new and difficult-to-forecast possibilities). That still would not diminish the force of our reason for saving more children. The variance of forecast becomes larger on both sides of the equation – whether we save the children or not – and the value of the upfront lives remains. A higher variance of forecast might increase the required size of the upfront benefit (to overcome the Principle of Roughness), but it would not refute the relevance of consequences more generally. We could increase the uncertainty more, but consequentialism still will not appear counterintuitive. The remedies, rather than curing somewhere in the range of 300,000–600,000 children, might cure in the broader range of zero to all one million of the children. By all classical statistical standards, this new cure scenario involves more uncertainty than the previous case, such as by having a higher variance of possible outcomes. Yet this higher uncertainty lends little support for the view that curing the children becomes less important.We still have an imperative to apply the remedy that appears best, and is expected to cure the greater number of children. This example may appear excessively simple, but it points our attention to the non-generality of the epistemic critique. The critique appears strongest only when we have absolutely no idea about the future; this is a special rather than a general case. Simply boosting the degree of background generic uncertainty should not stop us from pursuing large upfront benefits of obvious importance.

#### Outweighs on magnitude and probability—food shortages create volatile situations that make escalation likely

Wenyu et al ‘6

(Xie, Prof. Phil. @ Shandong U., Zhihe Wang, Prof. @ School of Phil. And Soc. Sci. @ Beijing Normal U., and George E. Derfer, School of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, and George E. Derfer, Prof. Emeritus @ Cal. Poly. Pomona, “Whitehead and China: Relevance and Relationship”, p. 28, Google Print)

The threats posed by war, imperialism, nuclear weapons, and terrorism are, furthermore, not the only threats to the continued existence of civilization for which global anarchy is responsible. There are also the interconnected threats of pollution, overpopulation, and resource shortages. Although there has been serious discussion of the population explosion since the 1960s, very little has been done tos top it. China is one of the few countries to have introduced effective measures to bring a halt to runaway population growth. In most of the rest of the world, continuation of the population explosion means that already struggling societies will, in the coming decades, be trying to meet the needs of twice as many people with the same resources, or even fewer. Resource wars, meaning wars in which natural resources are the primary cause, will surely become increasingly prevalent. As absolute shortages in food, water, and oil emerge, furthermore, the relative shortages, produced by the world’s highly inequitable allocation of resources, will become even more intolerable to disadvantaged groups, providing additional motivation for terrorism aagainst rich countries. Global apartheid combined with growing resource shortages combined with hatred of imperialism combined with nuclearism makes for a very volatile mixture.

#### Not passing farm bill is morally reprehensible—fails to feed poor families and cuts food aid and poverty reduction programs

Georgia Bulletin 11/21 – “Something—or something less—for everyone in new farm bill?”; 11/21/13; <http://georgiabulletin.org/news/2013/11/something-or-something-less-for-everyone-in-new-farm-bill/>

WASHINGTON (CNS)—The farm bill, already one year late, could be even later if the House-Senate conference committee working on the compromise version takes its sweet time.¶ According to Bob Gronski, a policy analyst with the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, the lawmakers are taking the bill one “title” at a time until the conference committee is satisfied with the result.¶ The most contentious issue is likely to be the nutrition title, which includes the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, once known as food stamps.¶ A 13.6 percent increase in that food aid, approved in 2009 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, expired Nov. 1. It’s the first cut in the program since it was started in 1964. House and Senate negotiators have two deals on the table: The Senate version, which cuts $4 billion from the program over the next 10 years, and the House version, which cuts nearly $40 billion instead.¶ Father Pat Delahanty, executive director of the Catholic Conference of Kentucky, did not mince words about what he thought of the House proposal.¶ “The number of people that that (cut) affects and the depth to which it affects is morally outrageous,” Father Delahanty told Catholic News Service Oct. 30. “I can’t believe that people who claim to have an interest in families would want to put poor families, low-income families, in a position where they can barely feed themselves. It’s just completely—well, it’s despicable, frankly. And it doesn’t need to happen.”¶ A similar sentiment emerged during an Oct. 30 media briefing with religious leaders from eight states in the Southeast, a region where the House delegations are largely Republican, and the GOP prevailed with the $40 billion SNAP cuts in its version of the farm bill.¶ A Bread for the World analysis of the cuts suggested that to make up for them, each church in the United States would have to increase its food assistance by nearly $15,000 a year for the next 10 years.¶ The Rev. Russell Meyer, a minister of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America who is executive director of the Florida Council of Churches, said the notion by some members of Congress that churches will pick up the slack “represents a tax on people of faith.”¶ Part of the problem is that the farm bill is a shrinking pie. “There’s less money in the farm bill now than there was six years ago” when the last farm bill was passed, said Adam Warthesen, federal policy organizer of the Minnesota-based Land Stewardship Project. “And what was in there then is less than there was in the farm bill before.”¶ Just about every title in the upcoming farm bill, Warthesen said, has less money to spread around than the farm bill that expired a year ago—and has since been subject to one extension after another as lawmakers have been unable to develop a satisfactory compromise.¶ The one exception, he said, was crop insurance. While insurance is necessary to protect farmers, according to Warthesen, insurance isn’t tied to conservation practices, in theory allowing for farmers to plan on land never used before for farming, or not suitable for farming, and then file insurance claims if the land doesn’t produce.¶ U.S. bishops who head their conference’s committees on domestic and international issues, in conjunction with the heads of the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, Catholic Relief Services, Catholic Charities USA and the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, sent letters Nov. 1 to House and Senate members outlining their shared priorities on the farm bill.¶ Those priorities include rejecting SNAP cuts as well as a proposal to eliminate access to SNAP benefits for former criminals and to tie the benefit to state “work requirements”—which would throw families off the rolls in an ongoing tenuous economy; supporting grants to help beginning, socially disadvantaged, and small and midsize farms and ranches; protecting conservation programs from further cuts; retaining conservation compliance for receiving subsidies for crop insurance premiums; and cutting crop insurance premium subsidies 15 percent for farmers who make more than $750,000 a year.¶ These are the same priorities this Catholic consortium has offered for more than a year whenever there seemed a chance that a farm bill could actually pass. If no bill is in place by Jan. 1, or yet another extension granted, milk prices could shoot through the roof because a truly expired bill resets the milk program back to 1949 levels.¶ Not only is the farm bill itself in limbo, but so are farmers. Jon Jovaag, who returned to farming his parents’ 400 acres near Austin, Minn., two years ago after working 15 years in farm-related industries, told CNS Nov. 7 there are U.S. Department of Agriculture web pages with grant application forms for conservation and for beginning farmers that still show up but can no longer be filled out.¶ Although farm prices have been good as of late, Jovaag said, it would have been much worse for him had not his parents already had land. Farmland in his region is selling for up to $10,000 an acre. “And the prices just keep going up each year,” he said.¶ The farm bill even has an international title because of food aid sent abroad. Eric Garduno, a CRS senior legislative specialist working in Washington, said CRS would like to be able to continue doing more than just hand out food in an emergency overseas.¶ “They all get it. They all understand how important the programs are,” Garduno said of Congress funding development programs meant to lessen the need for continued emergency aid. “but it’s tough to have a five-year development plan if you don’t have the money (for it). … That makes the program a little more robust, a little bit more than just handing out food. … At the same time, we need to make sure there is funding for the poverty reduction type programs.”¶ Garduno said CRS also would like to be able to get out of the business of taking surplus U.S. food and selling it overseas in order to raise funds for its program. He said CRS initially rebuffed the tactic when it first surfaced in the 1990s, adding that CRS eventually became one of the better aid agencies at selling the food.¶ Even so, there is the risk of disrupting local markets, which bring needed income to local farmers, when any agency starts selling U.S. food in those markets. Garduno said CNS “takes great care” not to disrupt those markets, but even in a best-case scenario, “the general consensus is that we’re losing 25 cents on the dollar” when selling U.S. food overseas.

#### Decision rule

Watson ‘77 (Richard, Professor of Philosophy @ Washington U, World Hunger and Moral Obligation, p. 118-119)

These arguments are morally spurious. That food sufficient for well-nourished survival is the equal right of every human individual or nation is a specification of the higher principle that everyone has equal right to the necessities of life. The moral stress of the principle of equity is primarily on equal sharing, and only secondarily on what is being shared. The higher moral principle is of human *equity per se*. Consequently, the moral action is to distribute all food equally, whatever the consequences. This is the hard line apparently drawn by such moralists as Immanuel Kant and Noam Chomsky—but then, morality is hard. The conclusion may be unreasonable (impractical and irrational in conventional terms), but it is obviously moral. Nor should anyone purport surprise; it has always been understood that the claims of morality—if taken seriously—supersede those of conflicting reason. One may even have to sacrifice one’s life or one’s nation to be moral in situations where practical behavior would preserve it. For example, if a prisoner of war undergoing torture is to be a (perhaps dead) patriot even when reason tells him that collaboration will hurt no one, he remains silent. Similarly, if one is to be moral, one distributes available food in equal shares (even if everyone then dies). That an action is necessary to save one’s life is no excuse for behaving unpatriotically or immorally if one wishes to be a patriot or moral. No principle of morality absolves one of behaving immorally simply to save one’s life or nation. There is a strict analogy here between adhering to moral principles for the sake of being moral, and adhering to Christian principles for the sake of being Christian. The moral world contains pits and lions, but one looks always to the highest light. The ultimate test always harks to the highest principle—recant or die—and it is pathetic to profess morality if one quits when the going gets rough. I have put aside many questions of detail—such as the mechanical problems of distributing food—because detail does not alter the stark conclusion. If every human life is equal in value, then the equal distribution of the necessities of life is an extremely high, if not the highest, moral duty. It is at least high enough to override the excuse that by doing it one would lose one’s life. But many people cannot accept the view that one must distribute equally even in f the nation collapses or all people die. If everyone dies, then there will be no realm of morality. Practically speaking, sheer survival comes first. One can adhere to the principle of equity only if one exists. So it is rational to suppose that the principle of survival is morally higher than the principle of equity. And though one might not be able to argue for unequal distribution of food to save a nation—for nations can come and go—one might well argue that unequal distribution is necessary for the survival of the human species. That is, some large group—say one-third of present world population—should be at least well-nourished for human survival. However, from an individual standpoint, the human species—like the nation—is of no moral relevance. From a naturalistic standpoint, survival does come first; from a moralistic standpoint—as indicated above—survival may have to be sacrificed. In the milieu of morality, it is immaterial whether or not the human species survives as a result of individual behavior.

## Uq

#### Will pass—there’s pressure now because of Thanksgiving recess

Baum 11/21 – Janell; Agricultural Communications program at the University of Illinois; writing for FarmFutures.com; “It’s Down to the Wire for Farm Bill Talks”; 11/21/13; <http://farmfutures.com/story-down-wire-farm-bill-talks-0-105219>

USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack Thursday echoed previous statements regarding the impact of the farm bill on rural America, this time unveiling a White House Rural Council report to back up his call for a bill by the end of the year.

Vilsack released the report during a press call, addressing key farm bill issues framing the policy discussion, and a tight timeline that is keeping the pressure on lawmakers to make things work.

Vilsack again reiterated a push for farmer and rancher certainty that the bill could provide, but also said one of the most pressing reasons for a new bill is that another extension of the 2008 farm bill could burden budget negotiations.

"With an extension there come costs," Vilsack said," and you don't get reforms that this bill being considered by the conference committee will provide."

Vilsack touted benefits of the bill – more rural jobs, enhanced economic growth for agriculture, food assistance protection, federal conservation priorities, stronger international market access, additional focus on research and overall deficit reduction.

In highlighting the economic benefits, Vilsack explained that savings are important to congress, given that extensions cost additional resources, too, that are difficult to quantify.

"The key here is to focus on getting the job done and understanding that there is a consequence if the job doesn't get done – and that consequence is that at some point in time, USDA will be responsible under the law to follow the law and begin instituting the policies of the 1940s.

"No one wants to do that," he added.

The secretary also addressed figures that point to a relationship between the economic health of the nation and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program – largely regarded as a key hurdle in farm bill negotiations.

"We're seeing reports that have been issued where the costs of the report are coming down," Vilsack said, presumably referencing a Nov. 20 report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities that found SNAP costs are leveling in correlation with recession recovery.

And, Vilsack said, underscoring his priorities on the issue, legislators should note that 92% of Americans on food stamps are elderly, people with disabilities, working adults or children. The other 8% are already subject to work requirements, though the requirements can be waived in times of economic hardship.

The work requirements, expected to be a bargaining chip for House representatives on the conference committee, have gotten a hard look from stakeholders in the food stamp/farm bill discussion. Vilsack, and the White House report, support maintaining a SNAP support, though Vilsack was quick to point out that some reform could be necessary.

"I think there are ways in which the program can be more efficient," Vilsack said. "I think there are ways in which we can encourage states to do a better job of creating and educating folks about work opportunities."

As far as a timeline, it's been rumored that a deal could come as quickly as the end of this week. There has also been speculation that this could be a make-or-break-it time for Congress, as they head out on Nov. 22 for a Thanksgiving recess, to return to Capitol Hill only for a short time in December before Christmas and New Year's holidays.

Though the timing is tight, Vilsack remained confident that progress was being made, even as nutrition assistance keeps things dodgy.

"I suspect that progress has been made and will continue to be made on the almost 90 differences that exist between the House and the Senate version," Vilsack said. "My suspicion is that the SNAP issue is one of the issues that will be last addressed."

#### Will pass—EPA ethanol decision pushed it to the finish line

The Hill 11/19 – Erik Wasson; “EPA ethanol decision pushes farm bill toward finish line”; 11/19/13; http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/agriculture/190777-epa-ethanol-decision-pushes-farm-bill-toward-finish-line

The Environmental Protection Agency’s preliminary decision to reduce renewable fuels blending requirements has increased momentum to get a farm bill done this year, the top House negotiator on the measure said Tuesday.

Rep. Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) argued that the ethanol decision, which is contributing to dropping corn prices, is helping all sides to come together behind a strong farm safety net.

He added an agreement is needed this week to pass a farm bill before the Dec. 13 Christmas recess target date. Senate Agriculture Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.) also told reporters Tuesday she is trying to get a framework agreement with the four top committee leaders this week or early next week.

“That’s been my problem early on, that there was two different camps on how we should proceed and they’re absolute. Suddenly, with the change in weather patterns, production yields and now government mandated demand being adjusted down, suddenly that’s driving all of us together,” Lucas said.

He said that the vulnerability of corn producers is helping resolve regional differences over whether the House or Senate farm subsidy approaches should be used.

The downward prices also mean that the farm safety net as scored by the Congressional Budget Office will be more costly—giving negotiators an added incentive to complete a deal before CBO takes away some of their deficit-cutting bragging rights. The current bill cuts $13 billion to $20 billion from farm programs.

On Friday, the EPA proposed draft 2014 blending volumes under the federal Renewable Fuel Standard that are lower than the 2013 requirements, and far less than called for in a 2007 law that expanded the mandate.

The EPA is proposing to require 15.21 billion gallons in 2014, down from 16.55 billion gallons in 2013, marking the first time the agency has lowered the target from the prior year.

Lucas said that corn drives all other grain prices and the pressure on corn prices hits all commodities.

The price pressure that is already applying to corn will cascade across all the other commodities,” he said. “It now means we will all be in this common downward trend.”

The House farm bill emphasizes a choice of price-based and revenue-based subsidies and based calculations more on the number of planted acres. The Senate farm bill, favored heretofore by corn growers, focuses more on revenue supports and historic production. Corn growers have argued the House approach distorts production and risks a trade war.

The chairman said that negotiators are still working on the $33 billion difference over food stamps cuts in the bill and he continues to push the stronger work requirements in the House-passed version.

He said that a push to change country-of-origin labeling (COOL) requirements being imposed by the Agriculture Department for meat this week is being left to open conference meetings and is not the subject of closed-door talks right now. The COOL fight pits packers and those worried about tariff retaliation by Canada over the labeling against ranchers and consumer groups.

## Pc key

#### Obama using political capital to complete farm bill negotiations

Reuters, 10/18 (“Obama says Americans 'completely fed up' with Washington,” 10/18/2013, <http://tvnz.co.nz/world-news/obama-says-americans-completely-fed-up-washington-5652654?ref=rss)>

President Barack Obama has scolded congressional Republicans, hours after a fiscal crisis was narrowly averted and called on his opponents to help repair the economic damage caused by a 16-day US government shutdown and a close brush with a debt default.

Obama stressed that he is willing to work with lawmakers wherever they can agree, but the tone he struck amounted to a rebuke of Republicans, whom Americans largely blame for pushing the United States to the brink of an economic calamity.

"The American people are completely fed up with Washington," said Obama in a White House speech attended by many of the aides who worked day and night through the various stages of the latest fiscal stalemate.

Hours after he signed into law a bill hastily cobbled together to end the crisis, Obama said events over the past two weeks had inflicted "completely unnecessary" damage on the US economy.

An increase in borrowing costs caused by the near-debt default was harmful and consumers cut back on spending with hundreds of thousands of government workers suddenly idled, he said.

"There was no economic rationale for all of this," he said.

Though bruised by the battle, Obama emerged as the clear winner. He immediately sought to use the political capital gained to advance a domestic policy agenda centered around a fresh round of budget talks and an effort to win approval of two stalled items, immigration reform and a farm bill.

## Link

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

## At: winners win

#### Wins don’t spillover—capital is finite and decreases—prioritizing it is key to 100-day agenda success

David Schultz, professor at Hamline University School of Business, 1/22/13, Obama's dwindling prospects in a second term, www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2013/01/obamas-dwindling-prospects-second-term

Four more years for Obama. Now what? What does Barack Obama do in his second term and what can he accomplish? Simply put, his options are limited and the prospects for major success quite limited. Presidential power is the power to persuade, as Richard Neustadt famously stated. Many factors determine presidential power and the ability to influence including personality (as James David Barber argued), attitude toward power, margin of victory, public support, support in Congress, and one’s sense of narrative or purpose. Additionally, presidential power is temporal, often greatest when one is first elected, and it is contextual, affected by competing items on an agenda. All of these factors affect the political power or capital of a president. Presidential power also is a finite and generally decreasing product. The first hundred days in office – so marked forever by FDR’s first 100 in 1933 – are usually a honeymoon period, during which presidents often get what they want. FDR gets the first New Deal, Ronald Reagan gets Kemp-Roth, George Bush in 2001 gets his tax cuts. Presidents lose political capital, support But, over time, presidents lose political capital. Presidents get distracted by world and domestic events, they lose support in Congress or among the American public, or they turn into lame ducks. This is the problem Obama now faces. Obama had a lot of political capital when sworn in as president in 2009. He won a decisive victory for change with strong approval ratings and had majorities in Congress — with eventually a filibuster margin in the Senate, when Al Franken finally took office in July. Obama used his political capital to secure a stimulus bill and then pass the Affordable Care Act. He eventually got rid of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and secured many other victories. But Obama was a lousy salesman, and he lost what little control of Congress that he had in the 2010 elections.